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Volume 1  is divided into 3 parts as follows:
Part  1   (Review  Paper)  discusses  the  admissibility  of  psychometric  evidence  of 
cognitive malingering  in  UK criminal  law courts. The paper opens with  a  historical 
account  of  psychologists  as  expert  witnesses,  highlighting  significant  advances 
relevant  to  malingering.  This  sets  the  context  for  a  discussion  about  current 
developments  in  policy  and  specifically  the  creation  of  a  UK  standard  for  the 
admissibility  of scientific evidence.  The  penultimate  section  outlines the  statistical 
and  methodological issues which challenge the development of empirical cognitive 
measures of malingering. The paper closes with a discussion of future directions for 
research and practice in presenting psychological evidence in court.
Part 2 (Empirical Paper) reports on a study testing the utility of a battery of measures 
to  identify simulating  malingerers from  healthy  controls  and  psychiatric  inpatients. 
The  battery of measures  were  chosen  for their different  approaches  to  detecting 
malingerers.  An  additional  qualitative  interview  was  given  to  the  simulating 
malingerers  to  investigate  the  strategies  they  used  to  fake  the  tests.  The 
performance of the test battery was compared to a  pre-existing  screening tool for 
malingering.  The results were discussed with reference to implications for research 
and practice.
Part  3  (Critical Appraisal)  reflects  on  the  process  of  undertaking  the  research.  It 
discusses the generalisability of the findings when  using  a simulating  malingering 
design, the utility of measuring reaction time to detect malingering, difficulties in the 
recruitment of inpatients,  the array of choices  in selecting the test battery and the 
clinical applications of the research.
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6Part 1: Review paper: Review of the admissibility of psychometric evidence of
cognitive malingering in criminal law courts 
1.1  Introduction
This  review  provides  a  variety  of  perspectives  on  the  admissibility  of  cognitive 
malingering tests in law courts in the United Kingdom (UK). In doing so, it spans the 
history of psychology in law courts, the current political debate on the development of 
guidelines  for  admissibility  of  scientific  evidence  and  the  statistical  and 
methodological issues relevant to cognitive measures of malingering.
Justification for the inclusion of these perspectives is given. An historical perspective 
provides  background  context  to  current  issues,  whilst  the  current  policy 
developments in this area give an indication of the various forces of influence which 
directly and indirectly affect clinical and forensic neuropsychologists. Statistical and 
methodological issues underpin the likelihood of a test standing up to challenges in 
court and  are  crucial to decisions  on  admissibility.  The  statistical  robustness  of  a 
measure also guides which tests are selected by clinical and forensic psychologists. 
The review concludes with a discussion of future directions for both research and the 
practice of presenting psychological evidence in court.
1.2 History of psychologists as expert witnesses
“Voila nos experts!”
(Robespierre, cited from Kargon, 1986)
The year 1781  saw one of the earliest introductions of science into the law courts. 
Robespierre,  then  a  little-known  French  lawyer,  associated the term  ‘experts’  with 
scientists in relation to Benjamin Franklin’s irrefutable discovery of the lightning rod.The defendant had erected a lightning rod on the chimney of his house which had 
caused  much  consternation  amongst  his  neighbours.  During  this  protracted  case, 
Robespierre  effectively  represented  both  his  defendant  and  the  emergence  of 
science as an influential force in society. In doing so, he challenged the assertion that 
judges should not hinder the advance of science (Kargon, 1986). In some ways, this 
has  become  a template for the  relationship  between  science  and  the  law,  which 
remains ambivalent and occasionally discordant today.
Munsterberg (1899) cautioned that, “Peoples [sic] never learn from history” and it has 
been further suggested that without understanding where forensic psychology came 
from,  it  is  hard to  understand where  it  is  going  (Bartol  &  Bartol,  2006).  Thus,  an 
introduction to the history of the profession’s emergence into the law courts is crucial 
to appreciate its present status and likely future progression. The following section 
outlines the history of psychologists as expert witnesses.
Modern forensic psychology began with the emergence of psychology into the law 
courts.  Experimental investigations into the reliability of witness testimony were the 
first applications of psychology (Loh,  1981;  Bartol & Bartol,  2006).  Cattell’s  (1895) 
informal experiments on his students suggested a wide range of individual difference 
in  degree  of  accuracy  and  level  of  confidence  when  recounting  an  event.  This 
generated  interest  in  the  psychology  of  testimony.  Binet  (1900)  replicated  these 
experiments  in  France  and  summarised  other  findings  in  the  field,  calling  for  a 
“science  psycho-judiciaire”  (Binet,  1905).  William  Stern  (1910)  developed  his 
‘Aussage’ or remembrance experiments in which he found that recall was influenced 
by  different ways  of questioning  and  suggestion.  This  finding  was  generalised  to 
unreliability  of  courtroom  witnesses.  As  a  result  of  these  first  experiments,  in 
Germany and Europe generally, psychologists began to work as expert witnesses in
criminal cases espousing both factual and opinion testimony (Bartol & Bartol, 2006).
8Hale (1980) suggested that the earliest case of an expert psychologist was in 1896, 
when Albert Von Schrenk-Notzing testified at the trial of a Munich man accused of 
murdering three women. Significant press coverage led to the notion of “retroactive 
memory falsification".  This  was  described  as  witnesses  confusing  what  they  had 
seen with what they had read in press reports.
1.2.1  Reaction time to detect deception
Between the turn of the twentieth century and World War One, interest emerged in 
studies of “guilt deception” in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Wertheimer & Klein 
(1904)  postulated that a person  guilty of a crime creates  a  ‘complex’  in the  mind 
which can be detected under the right conditions. One such detection strategy used a 
word association and reaction time task. One hundred words were presented to the 
suspect,  consisting  of  80  ‘innocuous’  words  and  20  words  pertaining  to  a  crime. 
Reaction  time  and  associated  word  were  recorded  by  the  psychologist.  When  a 
relevant word was read out, it was hypothesised that the suspect would either reveal 
his/her guilt by providing an  incriminating  response  relating to the crime,  or that it 
would take significantly longer to  inhibit an  incriminating  response and  provide  an 
innocuous  association.  This  test  showed  considerable  promise  but  was 
overshadowed by the introduction of the polygraph (Barland, 1988). Reaction time is 
still  considered  to  be  a  potential  discriminator  for  malingered  responses  (e.g. 
Vendemia et al., 2005).
1.2.2 Wigmore and Munsterberg: Professional dissonance and group averages
Hugo Munsterberg arrived to the US in 1892 championing the potential applications 
of psychology in a wide variety of fields. This culminated in his bestseller,  ’On the 
Witness Stand’  (Munsterberg,  1908) which promoted the use of psychology in law, 
particularly in areas of witness accuracy, jury persuasion, hypnosis and lie detection. 
Munsterberg’s  claims  were  accused  of  being  exaggerated  and  not  grounded  inempiricism (Wigmore,  1909).  In a damning paper satirising a hypothetical libel case 
against  Munsterberg,  Wigmore  (1909)  called  into  question  the  utility  of Aussage 
experiments to facilitate court verdicts.  He identified that the  results  of testimonial 
accuracy were based on group averages. In court, however, it is the reliability of an 
individual witness which  is called  into question. As such,  predictive percentages of 
testimonial  error  provide  misleading  results  when  used  to  support  a  verdict.  The 
critical difference is emphasis on frequency of testimonial error of witnesses rather 
than  on  the  impact  of  the  unreliability  on  the  trial  outcome.  The  focus  in  court 
becomes  reliability  of  testimony  rather  than  that  of  the  verdict.  Wigmore  (1937) 
highlighted an essential dissonance between social sciences and the law and,  as a 
result, a period of inaction between psychology and the law ensued (Loh, 1981). The 
presentation of evidence in court remains a point of contention today and one that 
has  led  to  unjust  rulings  in  high  profile  cases  (e.g.  Science  and  Technology 
Committee, 2005), as discussed later in this review.
Between  1911  and  1924,  Fernald  and  Healy  began  to  use  the  Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale to test for delinquency. From this, they developed their own set of 
23  performance  tests,  and  in  1924,  Healy  was  possibly  the  first  psychologist  to 
present  a  cognitive  assessment  in  court,  which  was  used  to  help  exonerate  two 
juveniles of murder on the grounds of developmental difficulties (Healy, 1924).
1.2.3  Marston: Jury research and presentation of scientific evidence
William Marston,  a tutee of Munsterberg,  identified the positive correlation between
systolic blood pressure and deception, which is the theoretical underpinning of the
modern polygraph (Marston, 1924). He was also the psychologist who testified in the
landmark  case  of Frye vs.  US  (1923),  which  defined  the  initial  standards  for the
admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Marston (1924) pioneered the first serious
jury research,  using  a  simulated jury design which  has formed the  basis for most
10subsequent jury research (Winick, 1961). Several findings remain pertinent today. He 
suggested that one trained jury member was a  more accurate fact finder than  an 
entire jury,  irrespective  of gender.  He  indicated  that females  performed  better as 
jurors than males. The professional training and experience of jurors were associated 
with  better  fact  finding  and  written  evidence  was  considered  superior  to  oral 
evidence. Marston (1924) concluded that the self-confidence of a witness can exert 
more influence on a jury than the content or persuasiveness of the testimony itself. 
He  recommended that courts  incorporate  his findings  into their practice,  however, 
such  recommendations  conflicted  with  procedures  which  are  integral  to  an 
adversarial system and consequently many were not implemented (Winick, 1961).
In the period between thel 940’s and early 1950’s, Wigmore became established as 
the major authority on the admissibility of expert evidence,  initiating the use of test 
data  in trials  and  crystallising  the  U.S.  federal  rules  of evidence  (Bartol  &  Bartol, 
2006). He predicted that the use of scientific test data would develop to become as 
influential as expert testimony had become to establish insanity, so long as the tests 
were recognised as valid and feasible by the general scientific community (McCary, 
1956).
From the late  1940’s onward,  it became more commonplace to find  psychologists 
testifying in cases. Frequent areas where they were called upon include the influence 
of  pre-trial  publicity  on  witnesses  and  juries,  the  effects  of  pornography  on 
adolescents, the effects of certain educational approaches on children and the likely 
influence  of  advertising  on  consumers  (Loh,  1981).  Despite  this,  psychological 
testimony was not yet readily accepted and the legal system,  on both sides of the 
Atlantic, still treated it with caution (Bartol & Bartol, 2006).
111.2.4  Rise in the professional standing of psychology
Before  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  criminal  law  courts  began  to  allow 
psychologists  as  expert  witnesses  on  issues  of  criminal  responsibility.  This 
turnaround  in  the  law’s  standpoint  is  considered  by  Loh  (1981)  to  be  due  to  the 
proliferation of mental health professionals at the time and the development of legal 
definitions  of  insanity  which  were  commensurate  with  psychiatric  practices.  A 
landmark  ruling  which  paved  the  way  for  psychological  testimony  on  insanity 
occurred in the case of the People v. Hawthorne (1940). Hawthorne was being tried 
for the murder of his wife’s lover and pleaded  not guilty due to insanity. The court 
initially refused the psychologist to testify as an expert witness, however, on referral 
to  the  Supreme  Court,  this  was  overruled  and  the  guideline  for qualifying  as  an 
expert  witness  was  defined  as  being  dependent  on  the  extent  of  the  witness’ 
knowledge rather than on a medical degree.  Nevertheless,  dissidents continued to 
contest that diagnosing insanity was the domain of medicine (Bartol & Bartol, 2006). 
A  landmark  ruling  in  1961  in  the  case  of  Jenkins  v.  US  led  to  direct  (albeit 
conditional)  support for psychologists  to  act  as  expert witnesses  on  questions  of 
mental illness and remains the current guiding principle on this issue in the US today 
(Bartol & Bartol, 2006).
From the  1970’s onward, the modern era of forensic psychology began.  Research 
and appearances in court flourished and the first professional forensic psychology 
body  paved  the  way  for  the  emergence  of  a  subsequent  professional  cognitive 
forensic body (Ginliano et al., 1997). The profession of cognitive forensic psychology 
now practices against a backdrop of the historical interchanges between psychology 
and the law. As such, the approach taken  by forensic and clinical psychologists in 
court can be seen to be directly influenced by history which has demarcated both the 
limitations of areas in which psychologists can testify and the nature and quality that 
the testimony should uphold.
121.2.5  Summary and conclusions
It has been suggested that the lessons previously learned have been forgotten and 
psychology and the law repeat patterns of ‘approach-withdrawal-rebuff’ (Loh,  1981). 
This has hampered the development of interdisciplinary collaboration and if one is to 
avoid a continual cycle of this friction, then there are certain themes from history that 
should be remembered today.
These include the way in which  psychological evidence is  presented  in  court,  first 
identified  by  Wigmore  (1937)  who  suggested  how  group  averages  should  be 
presented without  misleading  court decisions.  Psychology should  not overstate  its 
usefulness, as this has delayed cooperation in the past leading to the law questioning 
the  validity  and  reliability  of  psychological  evidence  (Blau,  1988).  History  also 
indicates areas of research which were not fully explored, such as the reaction time 
experiments of Wertheimer and Klein (1904) and Marston’s (1924) investigations into 
jury decision-making. Finally, the profession needs to delineate the areas in which it 
can make contributions with clarity,  so as to safeguard its future collaboration with 
the law.
It has taken approximately 100 years to reach a point in the UK where Ian Gibson, 
the Chairman  of the Criminal  Cases  Review Tribunal  has  stated that lawyers  and 
judges should  not feel  capable of dealing with scientific evidence themselves and 
should call on the assistance of scientists (Dyer, 2005, para. 14). This sets the stage 
for the  current discussions  which  are taking  place  between  science  and  the  law, 
which forms the next section of this review.
131.3  Current  developments  in  guidance  on  standards  for  admissibility  of 
scientific evidence
In  the  UK,  there  is  currently  no  standard  protocol  for  deciding  whether  scientific 
evidence  is  admissible  in  court  (Parliamentary  Office  of Science  and  Technology 
(POST),  2005).  During  the  2004/05  parliamentary  session,  the  Science  and 
Technology Select Committee (2005) discussed the necessity to develop guidelines 
to  standardise  the  admissibility  of  scientific  evidence  in  the  UK.  This  could  pre­
emptively settle  in-court disputes  and  allow for a  common  understanding  of what 
constitutes admissible evidence. This has the potential to defuse some of the law’s 
resistance against psychology and oblige the acceptance of psychological evidence 
with appropriate conditions.
The following section outlines the issues facing the development of these guidelines 
and considers the likely form such guidelines will take. This includes a more detailed 
discussion  of  the  US  guidelines  which  may  shape  the  basis  of  the  UK’s  future 
protocol (Science and Technology Committee, 2005).
1.3.1  Increasing usage of scientific evidence in court
Scientific evidence is increasingly used in court cases where there is an established
scientific practice (for example,  breathalysers) and in more innovative areas where
the scientific basis has yet to be validated (for example, lie detectors) (POST, 2005).
Scientific evidence  is almost always used  in  murder cases and  is becoming  more
regularly used in more frequent crimes such as burglary and car theft (POST, 2005).
Of the 140,000 cases dealt with by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in 2004-05,
2,500 required the use of FSS expert witnesses (website ref cited in POST 2005, ref
no. 2 at end).  In addition, the Legal Services Commission (LSC), the agency which
authorises the use of experts to guarantee their payment, estimated an expenditure
of £130 million per year on experts’ fees (POST, 2005).
141.3.2  The complexities of controlling the quality of scientific evidence in court
Currently,  individual judges  must  exercise  their discretion  over whether to  accept 
scientific evidence in court on an ad  hoc basis.  However, judges have  no specific 
training  in  the  rigorous  examination  of  scientific  evidence.  As  such,  there  is  no 
consideration  of  whether  a  theory  is  sufficiently  robust  and  evidence-based  to 
warrant admission  in  court (Science and Technology Committee,  2005).  Recently, 
high  profile  cases  have  thrown  the  shortcomings  of  existing  practice  into  the 
spotlight.  The  wrongful  convictions  of  Sally  Clark  and  Angela  Cummings  for 
murdering their babies, exposed the inadequacies, both of Professor Meadows, the 
expert presenting the erroneous statistical evidence, and of the court in evaluating 
the  admissibility  of  the  evidence.  Other  cases,  such  as  the  exoneration  of  the 
“Birmingham  six”  in  1991,  have also  received substantial  press coverage  drawing 
attention  to  the  fallings  of  our  current  system  in  appraising  forensic  evidence 
(Science and Technology Committee, 2005).
In developing a quality control for admitting  expert scientific evidence,  governance 
needs to be implemented at several levels. Expert witnesses must be vetted for their 
ability to provide reliable evidence, the courts, including judges and lawyers, need to 
be trained to make informed decisions about the validity of expert evidence and there 
needs to be a protocol for presenting expert evidence to the court, and particularly to 
jurors,  in  an  intelligible  and  impartial  fashion.  Each  of  these  levels  present  their 
individual problems and are discussed in turn.
The  court  is  responsible  for  establishing  the  competency  of  expert  witnesses 
(Science  and  Technology  Committee,  2005).  The  Council  for the  Registration  of 
Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) was founded in 1999 to provide a means of regulating 
this competency. Forensic practitioners are required to meet standards to ensure that
their  practice  is  up  to  date  and  competent.  To join  the  register,  applicants  must
15provide details of their qualifications and experience, references from colleagues and 
users of their services and declarations about their past and future conduct (Science 
and  Technology  Committee,  2005).  This  provides  a  means  of  supporting  the 
credibility of expert witnesses.
However, there are several problems with making registration mandatory. It has been 
suggested that registration is too easy and does not rigorously evaluate whether the 
practice of its registrants is evidence-based. It is suggested that a continual process 
of  peer  review  and  evaluation  is  needed  (Keogh,  2004,  para.  135).  Registration 
cannot be regarded as indisputable verification of competency (Sqibb-Williams, 2005, 
para. 135). As such, the CRFP must itself be subjected to independent auditing of its 
registration  process  (Science  and  Technology  Committee,  2005).  In  addition, 
emerging specialisms would be disadvantaged as assessors in their discipline may 
not  yet  exist.  This  could  restrict  the  courts  in  being  able  to  call  upon  the  latest 
developments  in  scientific  knowledge,  a  prerequisite  for  making  all  potentially 
applicable  information  available  in  fair  trials  (POST,  2005).  As  a  result,  the 
government response to the Science and Technology Committee stated that CRFP 
registration  should  not be  made  mandatory  (Science  and  Technology  Committee, 
2005a).
The CPS does not provide any compulsory training for lawyers in the understanding
and presentation of forensic evidence (Science and Technology Committee,  2005).
Although  lawyers  are  obliged  to  undergo  12  hours  continuing  professional
development each  year,  there  are  no  existing  provisions  necessitating  training  on
expert evidence. Whilst specific guidance has been developed for the presentation of
DNA evidence in court, further more generic guidance on presentation of scientific
evidence  is  not  specified.  It  falls  to  the  Bar  Council  to  make  such  provisions
mandatory.  The  Science  and  Technology  Committee  (2005)  recommended  a
16consultation  on  the  training  of  specialist  judges  and  barristers  to  increase 
understanding of specific areas of forensic evidence. This could provide an additional 
safeguard  against  the  impartial  presentation  of  scientific  evidence  and  another 
gateway for assessing the admissibility of forensic evidence.
The  adversarial  system  requires  that  an  expert  witness  be  called  by  either  the 
prosecution or the defence (Science and Technology Committee, 2005). As such, the 
witness is effectively providing evidence to strengthen the case of one side over the 
other. Though the expert is obliged to remain impartial, a survey commissioned by an 
expert witness training  company  Bond  Solon  (2002)  indicated that it is  commonly 
accepted  that  lawyers  do  not encourage  their witnesses  to  be truly  independent. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the defence will ‘shop around’ for an expert 
who  will  provide  the  most  favourable  evidence,  though  the  Criminal  Justice  Act 
(2003), section 35, makes provisions which are supposed to avoid this.
A possible  method  of overcoming this  problem  is the  use  of a  single joint expert 
witness who represents both parties. However, the European Convention of Human 
Rights  entitles  either  party  to  draw  on  their  own  expert  evidence  on  points  of 
contention (Science and Technology Committee, 2005). Another way to address this 
difficulty is to  prescribe  methods  of presenting  scientific evidence  so that it  is  not 
open to  interpretation.  Such  methods  have  been  introduced  in the  presentation  of 
DNA evidence to protect against misleading presentation of probability and statistics 
(Science and Technology Committee, 2005).  It seems possible to generalise this to 
all statistical presentations, thereby eliminating the element of persuasion from the 
presentation  of  scientific  evidence  that  has  marred  its  impartiality  (Science  and 
Technology Committee, 2005).
In summary,  measures to control the quality of forensic evidence must ensure that
17expert witnesses are competent and use scientifically valid techniques of an agreed 
standard.  The  basis for their interpretation  in  court  must also  be validated  before 
being  presented  as  evidence.  Implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
Science and Technology Select Committee (2005) hinge on establishing the Forensic 
Science Advisory Council  (FSAC).  This council  is to  be formed  by a  consultation 
group comprising  representatives from  the  Home  Office,  the  Association  of  Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities  (APA). To satisfy 
the code of conduct for an advisory committee, the FSAC must include lay members 
and experts among its members (Science and Technology Committee, 2006). It will 
be interesting to see who the ACPO and APA in conjunction with the HO recommend 
for the FSAC, as there already appears to be an overrepresentation of police interest 
in its formation. This is potentially concerning given prior accusations that the police 
cherry pick witnesses who provide a more convincing case, a practice that has been 
suggested  is  unlikely  to  lead  to  a  fair trial  (Science  and  Technology  Committee, 
2005).
1.3.3  Developing  a  gate-keeping  protocol  for  the  admissibility  of  scientific 
evidence
The first task of the FSAC is to develop a ‘gate-keeping’ protocol for the validation of 
scientific  evidence  (Science  and  Technology  Committee,  2005a).  The  council  will 
face  the  not  insignificant  task  of  drawing  together  suggestions  from  disparate 
services  with  vested  interests:  Legal  Services  Commission,  Association  of  Chief 
Police  Officers,  Association  of  Police  Authorities,  Home  Office,  Criminal  Justice 
System,  Scientific  Review Committee,  Criminal Cases  Review Committee,  Council 
for  Registration  of  Forensic  Practitioners,  Forensic  Science  Service.  These 
competing pressures must be handled by the  FSAC with the obligatory impartiality 
that  is  the  code  of  conduct  for  government  councils  (Science  and  Technology 
Committee, 2006).
18The standards that will comprise the gate-keeping test will be of particular interest to 
forensic  psychology  practitioners.  These  standards  will  ultimately  decide  which 
psychological  tests  will  meet  the  requirements  for  admission  in  court,  and  what 
inferences can be made from the test results.  It has been suggested that the future 
UK protocol will build on the existing US practice, which is based on the  Frye and 
Daubert principles (Science and Technology Committee, 2005). The Frye test dates 
back to 1923 and dictates that evidence from novel scientific techniques can only be 
accepted  if the technique falls  into  an  established  scientific field  and  is  generally 
accepted  within that community (Science  and Technology Committee,  2005).  The 
Daubert  test  superseded  this  and  is  today  considered  a  more  rigorous  set  of 
standards.  As  it is  likely that this test will form the  basis of a  UK procedure,  it is 
considered in more detail.
Since 1993, all federal courts and state jurisdictions in the US follow the Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 informed by the Daubert case. Rule 702 offers 4 criteria by which 
scientific validity may be assessed. It falls to the trial judge to consider whether the 
evidence meets these criteria (Vallabhajosula & van Gorp, 2001):
i) The technique at issue can or has been tested.
ii) The technique has been subjected to the scrutiny of the scientific community.
iii) Whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation, and the known 
or potential rate of error for such technique.
iv) Whether the technique  generally  has  been  accepted  in the  particular scientific 
field.
1.3.4  Lessons learnt from the US Daubert guidelines
In  this  way,  the  courts  are  invited  to  evaluate  the  reliability  and  validity  of  the
instruments used to collect data and also of the inferential methods used by clinicians
to  generate their opinions,  including  diagnoses  (Fiedler,  1997).  For example,  one
19such  case  which  applied  the  Daubert  guidelines  rejected  the  admissibility  of  the 
Minnesota  Multiphasic  Personality  Inventory  -  2  (Butcher,  Graham,  Dahlstrom, 
Tellegen & Kaemmer, 1989) in relation to sex offender profiles. The heterogeneity of 
sex  offenders  rendered  the  instruments’  classifications  inadmissible  based  on 
unreliable  methodology  and  unacceptable  scientific  validity  (Rogers,  Salekin  & 
Sewell, 1999).
Two further rulings by the Supreme Court in 1997 and 1999, broadened the Daubert 
ruling.  The  first  ensured  the trial  courts  adopted  a  ‘gatekeeping’  role  to  exclude 
unreliable  evidence  and  the  second  widened  this  gatekeeping  function  to  permit 
expert  witness  evidence  that  was  not  based  on  science.  Together  these  rulings 
emphasised that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to evaluate scientific validity 
and  how the  evidence can  be applied to the facts  in  issue  (Vallabhajosula  & van 
Gorp,  2001).  This  may  prove  problematic  if  the  UK  were  to  follow  the  same 
procedure,  as  has already been discussed, the scientific  knowledge of  UK judges 
may not be adequate to make such decisions.
When  implementing  these  guidelines,  the  US  courts  have  had  some  difficulty  in 
analysing  the  scientific  validity  of  evidence.  For  example,  in  Chappie  v.  Gangar 
(1994), the court accepted psychometric test results for normal scores, but rejected 
scores significantly below the norm because the conclusion drawn that these scores 
related to permanent brain damage in children was not considered scientifically valid. 
The  full  methodology  of  the  experts  must  be  taken  into  account,  including  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  the  data.  The  Daubert  guidelines  state  that  the  entire 
reasoning process must be valid  (Daubert v.  Merrell  Dow Pharmaceuticals,  1993). 
The courts’ difficulty in assessing scientific validity is hardly surprising. This area is 
fraught with complexities which vary according to the vast array of scientific evidence
that can potentially be presented to a court. The following section will consider how
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cognitive  malingering.  It shows that  even  among  specialist experts  in  a  narrowed 
field, there is still controversy over assessing validity.
1.4  Current  practice  of  presenting  psychometrics  to  detect  cognitive 
malingering in criminal law courts
1.4.1  Commonly used neuropsychological tests to detect malingering
Currently the most common tests of cognitive malingering which are presented to law 
courts in the US are cited as being the Rey Fifteen Item Test (FIT) (Rey,  1964), the 
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) (Rees, Tombaugh, Gansler & Moczynski, 1998) 
and the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP) (Frederick & Crosby, 2000). These tests were 
suggested by Vallabhajosula and van Gorp (2001) to be the most commonly used in 
their paper which  evaluated tests that more  likely meet the  Daubert criteria.  They 
also emerge as the most popular psychometric tests of malingering with US forensic 
neuropsychologists from a search of the LEXIS “Combined Federal and State Case 
Law - US” database, in which  15 out of  18 published tests which refer to cognitive 
malingering  used them  (Mossman,  2003). The author of this  review replicated the 
above  search  on  the  UK  LEXIS  database,  using  the  same  search  criteria  as 
Mossman  (p.231,  2003),  however there were  no  references to the  use of specific 
tests of cognitive malingering in UK courts.
Possible reasons for this may include reluctance on the part of UK practitioners to 
cite formal measures of malingering because of fears that categorising a malingerer 
may necessitate a subsequent charge of perjury. Also, formal criteria for assessing 
suitability  of  these  measures  do  not  yet  exist,  meaning  that  their  use  has  not
developed with the same impetus as in the US. In addition, the UK database is not as
21thorough at listing references to particular scientific measures as the US version and 
so searches do not throw up as many examples. For whatever reason, it seems plain 
that there  is less to instruct UK neuropsychologists  on which tests to select when 
preparing court reports regarding symptom validity.
From  a  research  perspective,  a  meta-analysis  conducted  by Vickery  et  at.  (2001) 
suggested that the most effective neuropsychological tests of inadequate effort are 
the Digit Memory Test (DMT), Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT), 15-Item Test, 
21-Item Test, and the Dot Counting (Lezak, 1983). In a book reviewing the detection 
of  response  bias  in  forensic  neuropsychology,  Horn  and  Denny  (2002)  selected 
papers which discussed the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (Slick,  Hopp, Strauss & 
Thompson,  1997),  the  Word  Memory  Test  (Green,  Allen  &  Astner,  1996),  the 
Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory - 2 (Butcher, Graham, Dahlstrom, Tellegen & Kaemmer,  1989), Weschler 
Adult  Intelligence  Scale  3rd   Edition  (Weschler,  1997),  Weschler  Memory  Scale  - 
Revised  (Weschler,  1987),  the  Halstead-Reitan  Battery  (Reitan  & Wolfson,  1985), 
and the Category Test (Bolter, 1985), in addition to the tests mentioned above.
There is no shortage of neuropsychological measures of dissimulation and,  indeed, 
exploratory research is still flourishing in this area. This may be due to a combination 
of factors. There are different categories of measure which may be more appropriate 
for different populations, there is no one measure which is absolutely categorical and 
indeed  many researchers  recommend the  use of a  battery of tests to corroborate 
findings (e.g.  Rogers,  1997).  In addition, each individual measure has questionable 
accuracy.
1.4.2  Within-test strategies for detecting malingering
The  array  of  cognitive  measures  of  malingering  have  been  categorised  into  six
22groupings according to the detection strategy used and have been evaluated for their 
potential validity (Rogers, Harrell & Liff, 1993). In brief, the groupings are as follows:
Floor Effect
Failure on simple tasks that even severely impaired persons would pass on defines 
the  floor  effect  strategy.  It  is  hypothesised  that  failure  on  simple  informational 
questions (for example, “Which is bigger, a horse or a dog?”) effectively differentiates 
malingerers.  Examples of such tests include the Rey 15 Item Memory Test (Lezak, 
1983)  and The Wiggins and  Brandt Personal  History  Interview (Wiggins &  Brandt, 
1988). The latter asks questions that even people with severe memory loss are able 
to  answer  correctly  (e.g.  “What  is  your  name?").  The  use  of  such  techniques  is 
ethically  questionable  when  the  difficulty  of  the  task  is  stressed  so  as  to  tempt 
malingerers into feigning  (e.g.  Drob & Berger,  1987).  It is also considered that the 
transparency of such a technique will not identify more sophisticated malingerers.
Performance Curve
This  compares  the  number  of  easy  items  failed  to  the  number  of  difficult  items 
passed.  The hypothesis is that malingerers will not alter their response patterns to 
account for differences in item difficulty. Comparing their performance curve to ‘true’ 
patient  groups  can  potentially  differentiate  malingerers.  Examples  of  such  tests 
include use of the Rey Dot Counting and Word Recognition Test, recommended by 
Lezak (1983), who suggested that truthful respondents would be likely answer easier 
recognition  tests  correctly  and  harder  recall  questions  with  more  mistakes.  She 
hypothesised  that  malingerers  would  not  have  the  same  pattern  of  responses  in 
relation to the increasing difficulty of the questions. This strategy has been utilised 
with success on memory tasks (Graf, Squire & Mandler,  1984) and intelligence tests 
(Gudjonsson & Shackleton, 1986).
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Differences  in  response  error are  suggested  to distinguish  malingerers from  valid 
respondents. An example of this, which is possibly where the strategy emerged,  is 
the Ganser Syndrome (Rogers,  Harrell & Lift,  1993). This proposes that proximate 
answers  are  more  likely  of  malingerers  (i.e.  near  misses).  The  initial  underlying 
theory  supposes  that  malingerers  who  know the  correct  answer  and  suppress  a 
truthful response,  reveal their deception by answering close to the correct answer. 
There is still much research to be done on this area to determine whether there exist 
identifiable  patterns  of  malingered  responses  (Rogers,  Harrell  &  Liff,  1993).  Such 
research includes investigations into both ‘near misses’ and ‘gross errors’ (e.g. Bruhn 
& Reed, 1975; Rogers, Harrell & Liff, 1993).  The latter incorporates an extension to 
this  theory that  some  malingered  responses  will  be  excessively  distant  from  the 
correct answer.  Powell  (1991)  has shown promising  results in  research measuring 
simulating malingerers of schizophrenia on the Mini-Mental State. Malingerers had a 
greater proportion of both proximal and distal answers on cognitive items.
Symptom Validity Testing
Symptom  validity  tests  (SVT's)  attempt  to  detect  malingerers  by  identifying  a
response style that is significantly worse than would be achieved by chance.  If the
probability  of  wrong  responses  is  significantly  worse  than  an  impaired  person
responding  randomly then such test results  indicate malingering.  Pankrantz (1983)
explored  this  strategy on  a  test which  measured  feigned  deafness.  Respondents
were required to choose between the presence or absence of sound. During the test,
sounds  were  presented  half  the  time.  Malingerers  were  found  to  answer  more
questions wrongly than would be expected by chance responding. Variations on this
strategy increase the sophistication of the  method, for example,  by increasing the
number of possible responses or examining performance across time (e.g.  Hiscock
and Hiscock, 1989). A strength of this approach is the lack of alternative explanations
24for significantly below-average responding. A relative weakness is that in simulation 
designs,  few  simulating  malingerers  score  significantly  below  average  (Rogers, 
Harrell & Liff, 1993).
Atypical Presentation
Varying  or  atypical  performances  are  thought  to  distinguish  malingerers.  These 
include  significant  differences  when  re-administering  the  same  measure,  or 
significant differences on parallel tasks which test the same ability (e.g. Wasyliw & 
Cavanaugh,  1988).  However,  both  functional  disorders  and  brain-injured  patients 
may  present  similarly  inconsistent  response  styles  (Pankratz,  1988).  Atypical 
presentations have also not been adequately tested via simulation or clinical sample 
designs (Rogers,  Harrell & Liff,  1993) and so further support is needed before their 
recommended use.
Psychological Sequelae
In addition to feigned cognitive deficits,  it is thought that malingerers also reported 
elevated  levels  of  psychological  symptoms,  such  as  emotional  disorders  or 
personality  abnormalities  (e.g.  Heaton  et  al.,  1978).  Schacter  (1986)  researched 
amnesiacs attitudes towards their memory loss. Simulating malingerers were found 
to  overstate their pessimism  about recovery.  The  main  problems with  this type  of 
approach  is  that the  psychological  sequelae  of genuine  patient  groups  is  largely 
unknown  (Rogers,  Harrell &  Liff,  1993).  It is  also contended that malingerers  may 
have  insight  into  the  likely  sequelae  of  certain  conditions,  for  example 
‘postconcussion  syndrome’  (Mittenberg  et  al.  1990).  Further  study  is  needed  to 
establish the utility of this approach.
1.4.3  A closer examination of the Daubert guidelines
Once the approach has been selected, the procedures for evaluating which test to
25choose when considering admissibility in court would, at the moment, most sensibly 
follow the Daubert guidelines.  However, these are only guidelines and are not strict 
criteria  which  can  be  unconditionally  fulfilled.  The  following  section  outlines 
considerations which may be taken into account under each Daubert criterion.
Daubert criterion (i): Has the procedure been tested?
In considering whether a measure has been adequately tested, one should consider 
firstly whether it has been evaluated by researchers. This could include whether the 
investigators were independent and not allied to the tool in question  (Millis,  2002). 
The methodology used to evaluate the measure should also be scrutinised.  In the 
case  of  a  measure  of  cognitive  symptom  validity,  one  would  need  to  weigh  up 
whether  the  research  includes  both  simulation  design  and  clinical  samples.  The 
difficulties with validating measures using clinical samples of known malingerers are 
well documented  (e.g.  Rogers,  1997) due to problems identifying  malingerers who 
are by definition elusive. Simulation designs may be the standard research method, 
but  validation  using  this  technique  alone  may  be  questioned  when  relating  the 
findings  to  suspected  ‘true’  malingerers  in  court.  Simulating  malingerers  are  not 
adequately  representative  of the  response  style  of true  malingerers  and  as  such, 
cannot be used alone to influence court decisions.
The test may also be evaluated  in terms of the clinical disorders that it has  been 
tested on, e.g.  both psychiatric and neurological disorders. This allows the forensic 
practitioner  to  establish  an  ‘empirical  floor’  or  base  rate  of  norm-referenced 
diagnostically specific samples which enables cut-offs to be decided upon (Bianchini, 
Mathias & Greve, 2001). Hence, more accurate estimations can be made about how 
someone  with  a  genuine  disorder  would  perform  on  the  test  and  above-chance
estimates of feigning can be made with more confidence.
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community?
Scrutiny in the scientific community necessitates  peer review and  publication.  The 
extent  to which  this  has  happened,  denoted  both  by  number  of publications  and 
credibility  of  the  peer  review  journals  will  determine  whether  a  test  meets  this 
criterion.  New  measures  for  detecting  symptom  validity  would  be  of  distinct 
disadvantage  here,  as  has  been  identified  by  the  Science  and  Technology 
Committee (2005). Novel methods would be excluded on the basis that they have not 
had  adequate  time  to  receive  peer  review.  This  is  contrary to the  law’s  ethos  of 
making all evidence available to the court.  Leeway should be given when debating 
this  criterion  in  court to  allow for  innovative  methods  to  emerge  and  not to  stifle 
burgeoning  areas  of  research.  This  criterion  should  perhaps  not  be  used  as  a 
deciding factor for admitting a measure.
Daubert criterion (iii): What are the standards controlling the technique’s operation, 
and what is the known or potential rate of error for such a technique?
A tests accuracy is determined by its error rate. Without an acceptable error rate, the 
test will  be deemed  unreliable (criterion  1)  and will not stand  up to the scrutiny of 
peer review or be accepted by the scientific community (criteria 2 and 4). As such, 
the potential of a test to reach the standards of admissibility following the  Daubert 
guidelines  can  be  understood to  pivot  on  its  error rate.  Despite this,  none  of the 
cases which  have  applied the  Daubert guidelines to tests of cognitive malingering 
have  discussed  the  error rate  in  court  (Mossman,  2003).  This  has  led to  calls to 
establish a set error rate as a standard for the scientific community, which can also
facilitate determining admissibility in court (Vallabhajosula & van Gorp, 2001).
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whether the measure reaches this statistical standard and secondly, how conclusions 
drawn from the test are presented to the court and related to the case in question. 
These points will be discussed in turn.
1.4.4  Statistical standards for malingering tests
The scientific validity of a test of cognitive malingering is determined by its sensitivity, 
specificity,  positive  predictive  value  (PPV)  and  negative  predictive  value  (NPV). 
Sensitivity is the probability of a positive test (i.e. a score above the cut-off on a test 
designed to detect malingering) among individuals who are malingering. Specificity is 
the probability of a  negative test (i.e.  a score below the cut-off) among  individuals 
who are not malingering. The PPV is the proportion of clients who are identified by a 
test as having malingered who actually are malingering. The NPV is the proportion of 
clients who are identified by a test as not malingering who are in fact not malingering. 
It  provides  a  probability  that  a  client,  who  scores  below  a  cut-off,  is  actually  not 
malingering.  Sensitivity  and  specificity are  independent  of base  rates  and  directly 
dependent  on  the  cut-off  employed.  They  provide  a  categorical  classification  of 
malingering. PPV and NPV represent the predictive power of the test, the confidence 
that  one  can  have  that  the  classification  is  correct  (Greve  &  Bianchini,  2004). 
Predictive power is considered to be the most clinically relevant function to assess 
efficacy of prediction with regard to malingering (Vallabhajosula & van Gorp,  2001; 
Rosenfeld, Sands & van Gorp, 1997; Rogers, 1997).
By altering the cut-off value, one can increase the sensitivity of a test. However, cut­
offs designed to capture ambitiously high numbers of malingerers will likely result in 
higher numbers of false positives (i.e. identifying honest responders as malingerers). 
Similarly,  altering the cut-off to maximise specificity will compromise sensitivity andresult  in  higher numbers  of false  negatives  (i.e.  identifying  malingerers  as  honest 
responders). Given the pejorative connotations of applying the label of ‘malingerer’, 
many consider it more acceptable to  allow false  negative errors  in favour of false 
positive  errors  (Wasyliw &  Golden,  1985).  Greve  &  Bianchini  (2004)  describe  the 
‘burden of error’ as being carried by the individual patient in cases of false positives 
and the consequences for them personally, financially and occupationally. Whereas 
in cases of false  negatives, the burden  is carried by society,  for example,  missing 
malingerers reduces the pool of resources for legitimate claimants (Franzen, Iverson 
& McCracken, 1990). When setting cut-off rates for use in court, one must be mindful 
of whether the  emphasis  in  an  individual  case  is  on  specificity  or sensitivity.  For 
example,  more  emphasis  may  be  given  to  society  in  the  case  of  a  suspected 
malingerer in a forensic setting who is claiming diminished responsibility for a serious 
crime.  In contrast,  more emphasis may be given to the individual in the case of a 
claimant who has been injured in an industrial accident and is being assessed for the 
veracity of his reporting of posttraumatic stress symptoms. Fixed levels of sensitivity 
and  specificity  are  therefore  not  attractive  and  individual  cases  should  consider 
suitable cut-offs on merit.
Given the importance of specificity over sensitivity,  making decisions about cut-offs 
should  be  based  primarily  on  specificity.  To  minimise  vulnerability  to  Daubert 
challenges the error rate should be reported transparently. Where only a single cut­
off is set, it should be done to give perfect specificity. More commonly, a range of cut­
offs are reported according to pre-determined specificity levels (e.g. .80, .85, .90., .95 
and 1.00), and then providing the corresponding sensitivity levels (Greve & Bianchini, 
2004). This allows the development of a continuum of predictive power below 100%. 
The predictive power associated with these cut-offs can then be related to a range of 
likely base rates of malingering for a given population.
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Hart,  1996;  Heaton,  Smith,  Lehman  & Vogt,  1978).  Base  rates  of malingering  in 
litigating populations has been reported to vary between 7.5 to 33 percent, whilst in 
forensic  populations  it  is  thought to  be  even  higher  (Vallabhajosula  &  van  Gorp, 
2001).  However,  it is considered unlikely that base rates would exceed .30 in most 
settings  (Sweet,  1999).  When  there  is  no  indication  of  base  rates  for  a  given 
population and only one is to be reported, it is recommended that predictive power is 
calculated  using  a  base  rate  of  .30  (e.g.  Vallabhajosula  &  van  Gorp,  2001; 
Mittenberg, Patton, Cannock & Condit, 2002).
Setting the cut-off is further dependent on 3 factors, the distribution of scores, the 
sample size and the sample composition.  If the distribution of scores is skewed,  it 
may not be possible to establish cut-offs that result in recommended specificity rates. 
Scores that are more continuous and less heavily skewed will be easier to allocate 
cut-off values.  However,  on  many symptom-validity tests,  for example the TOMM 
(Tombaugh,  1996),  few  respondents  make  errors  which  heavily  skews  the 
distribution  of scores  and  makes  it  harder to  assign  cut-offs  (Greve  &  Bianchini, 
2004). The size of the nonmalingering control group is also crucial to determining cut­
off values.  Smaller nonmalingering sample sizes means that the cut-off value must 
also be smaller so that each individual does not represent too significant a proportion 
of the sample.  For example, with a control group of 20 nonmalingerers,  a cut-off of 
.99 would mean that each participant accounts for an unacceptable 5% of the sample 
(Greve & Bianchini,  2004).  Finally,  there must be at least 2 groups in a simulating 
malingering design as sensitivity and specificity are determined by a comparison of 
the performance of individuals in the groups. In addition, to determine sensitivity, one 
must  be  very  confident  that  individuals  in  the  malingering  group  are  indeed 
malingerers.  This  is  a  common  failing  of designs  which  use  ‘genuine’  suspected
malingerers from  clinical  samples  (Bianchini,  Mathias,  Greve,  Houston  &  Crouch,
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1.4.5  Presenting test results in court
Once  it  has  been  established  that the data  reaches  an  acceptable  statistical  and 
scientific standard, it falls to the expert witness to present the findings in such a way 
that they do  not misrepresent the generalisability of the findings nor overstate the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them. There is an essential difference between 
law and psychology which leaves them fundamentally at odds. This difference can be 
understood from philosophical mathematics.
The detection of malingering follows the Bayesian method for determining predictive 
accuracy (Mossman,  2003).  Expert witnesses are limited in doing  no  more than to 
provide  information  which  contributes  to  the  formation  of  opinion  relevant  to  the 
matter at hand (Wagenaar, 1988). They should not provide final opinions themselves. 
Law,  however,  seeks  to  align  disparate  viewpoints  and  find  a  categorical  stance 
(Vallabhajosula & van Gorp, 2001).
Probability can be thought of a subjective degrees of belief. An opinion is related to
the  probability that  a  hypothesis  is  true.  Thus,  opinion  delivered  in  court  can  be
evaluated for its relevance in terms of the probability that it is true (i.e. its error rate).
Conversely,  information refers to the probability of finding evidence only when the
hypothesis is true. Thus if the hypothesis is equivocal, the information or evidence
gleaned from  it is even  more shaky.  Furthermore,  opinion and  information  can  be
confounded  and  this  becomes  evident  when  judges  and  judiciary  ask  for  expert
opinion that transgresses their expertise.  Mistakes occur when their statements are
substituted as a court’s opinion  (Wagenaar,  1988). There is a need to make clear
what conclusions can be drawn from the opinion and the limited influence that these
conclusions should have on the matter at hand.
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evidence. A standard wording for presenting this probabilistic scientific evidence is 
intended  to  become  mandatory  and  is  followed  by  an  explanation  of  how  the 
evidence should be interpreted in relation to the case. The new recommendation for 
wording the presentation of DNA evidence  is as follows (Science and Technology 
Committee, 2005):
“The probability that an unknown person,  unrelated to the defendant, would 
have the same profile as the crime sample is 1  in X [the relevant figure].”
This aims to standardise the presentation of scientific evidence so as to reduce the 
chances  of  juries  and  judiciary  misinterpreting  the  findings.  When  presenting 
psychometric  evidence  to  courts,  the  process  should  be  equally  systematic.  A 
standard wording for presenting psychometric results could also be made mandatory.
In summary, the initial stage of selecting a type or types of test is followed by the 
selection of specific tests of malingering, which ideally should incorporate a variety of 
techniques to  improve  discriminatory  power.  Standards for selecting  the tests  are 
explained and the method for presenting conclusions is elucidated. Following such a 
procedure  heightens the chance  of a  battery of tests  being  admitted  in  court and 
subsequently standing up to challenge.
1.5  Future of admissible psychological evidence of cognitive malingering
Future  research  which  seeks  to  develop  neuropsychological  tests  of  malingering 
should  consider  past  investigations  which  have  indicated  areas  of  useful  inquiry. 
These  can  be  gleaned  from  reviewing  literature  which  reports  salient  historical
experiments  and  research.  This  paper  identifies  certain  techniques  pertinent  to
32assessing  cognitive  malingering,  particularly,  the  use  of  forced-choice  self-report 
symptom  inventories  and  the  reaction  time  experiments  of Wertheimer  and  Klein 
(1904).
In addition, when seeking to develop a battery of cognitive tests of malingering for 
use in court, one should consider the political context in which the battery of tests will 
be evaluated. This review discusses changing policy in this area which has a direct 
impact on forensic neuropsychologists. In the near future, it is likely that tests will be 
considered with far more scrutiny than has been the case thus far. When developing 
a new battery of tests,  researchers should aim for a minimum standard denoted by 
the Daubert guidelines.  Further, the way in which results of such tests are presented 
in  court  should  be  standardised,  to  minimise  misinterpretation.  The  paper 
recommends good  practice for presenting findings using  a range of specificity and 
sensitivity levels.
As  protocols controlling the  admissibility of scientific evidence tighten,  research  in 
this  field  must  respond  to  ensure  the  continued  usefulness  of  psychological 
contributions  to  court  processes.  Given  the  capricious  nature  of  the  relationship 
between psychology and the law,  it should be expected that forensic psychologists 
will  be  strongly  challenged  in  court.  Therefore,  it  is  important  that  psychological 
research  compensates  by  developing  tools  which  will  stand  up to  more  vigorous 
challenge. Future research should continue to explore all the avenues that the history 
of empirical and experimental psychology has made available and develop tests that 
outperform  its  scientific  counterparts,  whilst  presenting  itself with  an  understated 
restraint that will not provide fodder for psychology’s many presumptuous doubters.
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43Part 2: Empirical Paper: Malingering of Cognitive Symptoms
2.0 Abstract
Malingering has significant consequences on social and economic levels. Studies on 
the detection of dissimulation recommend a variety of detection strategies across a 
battery  of  tests  to  maximise  discriminatory  power.  Investigations  into  specific 
domains, such as cognitive symptomatology, are proposed as an additional focus for 
malingering research. This study tested the utility of a battery of measures focussing 
on  cognitive functioning  to  distinguish  malingerers  from  healthy  controls  and  true 
patients  using  a simulating  malingering  design.  One hundred  and five  participants 
completed  a  battery  of tests  which  were  compared  to  a  pre-existing  malingering 
screening tool. The simulating  malingerers reported on the strategies they used to 
feign illness via a qualitative interview. Findings indicated that the battery of cognitive 
measures had better discriminatory power than the screening tool. The utility of using 
certain  detection  strategies  are  discussed.  The  approaches  malingerers  take  are 
compared to the detection strategies used in malingering tools. Implications for future 
research and practice are considered.
2.1 introduction
2.1.1 Definition and prevalence of malingering
Dissimulation  refers to a variety of response styles  relevant to the assessment of 
symptom  validity.  Malingering  is  distinctly  defined  as the  conscious  fabrication  or 
gross exaggeration of physical and/or psychological symptoms for an external goal 
(American  Psychiatric Association,  1994).  It is further distinguished from  factitious 
disorders in that the malingered symptomatology is not motivated by embellishing the 
patient role and is explicable in the context of the individual (Rogers, 1997).
44The  estimated  prevalence  of malingering  ranges from  1/6^  of forensic psychiatric 
patients (Rogers & Cruise, 2000) to between 8% and 30% of populations deemed to 
be at risk of malingering (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock & Condit, 2002). In a review of 
the  literature,  Rogers,  Harrell  &  Liff  (1993)  suggested  50%  of  claimants  of 
neurological injury were feigning or exaggerating their cognitive deficits. In claims of 
diminished responsibility due to insanity,  it is estimated that 21% of defendants are 
suspected malingerers (Rogers,  1986).  Not only is malingering more prevalent than 
is  commonly  suspected,  the  frequency  is  compounded  by the  seriousness  of the 
consequences  of  successful  malingering,  particularly  in  criminal  cases  (Rogers, 
1997).
2.1.2  Use of psychological testing in medicolegal contexts
Neuropsychological  evidence  is  becoming  increasingly  accepted  in  civil  litigation 
cases  where  large  sums  of  money  can  powerfully  reinforce  the  temptation  to 
malinger (Vickery,  Berry,  Inman,  Harris & Orey,  2001).  Scientific evidence  is  also 
more commonplace in criminal cases.  It is becoming more regularly used in prolific 
crimes such  as  burglary and  car theft and  is  almost always  used  in  murder trials 
(POST, 2005).
Successful malingerers cost in terms of money, time and resources (Rogers,  1997). 
With the numbers of proceedings in which there is the potential motivation to feign 
impairments  increasing  (e.g.  Reynolds  1998),  the  need  for  valid  methods  of 
identifying  malingerers  grows.  However,  detection  of  malingering  using  standard 
instruments,  as  opposed  to  tests  specifically  designed  to  detect  malingering,  is 
unsatisfactory  (Ziskin,  1984).  The  American  Psychiatric  Association 
Neuropsychology  Division  has  been  recently  recommended  that  every  forensic 
evaluation  incorporate a measure of symptom validity (http://www.div40.org/). This,
coupled with the impact of successful malingerers on services, emphasises the need
45to develop empirically sound tests of malingering (Rogers,  1997).
2.1.3  Methodological and conceptual issues in the development of malingering 
detection tools
Methodological difficulties plague the development of empirical instruments designed 
to detect malingering. The presentation of any one malingerer is highly idiosyncratic 
depending on the contextual and personal variables motivating the individual to feign 
symptoms (Rogers, 1990). Furthermore, the nature of the feigned symptoms will vary 
according to the level of understanding of the condition one is attempting to malinger 
(Pankratz & Binder, 1997). Heterogeneity in malingering conflicts with the conceptual 
underpinning  of standardisation which  seeks to  identify common  characteristics  of 
malingerers. In order to overcome this heterogeneity, tools for measuring malingering 
need to include a number of different indices. The development of a tool to measure 
malingering must reach a compromise by seeking to minimise the number of false 
positives (i.e.  inadvertently identifying true patients as malingerers) and identify the 
symptoms malingerers demonstrate which true patients do not.
Considering the likelihood of false positives, results from malingering tools which rely
on  self-report  descriptions  of  psychiatric symptoms  alone  should  be  corroborated
with further evidence of malingering (Rogers,  1997; Miller, 2001). A battery of tests
which  incorporate  several  detection  strategies,  such  as  floor effect,  magnitude  of
error,  symptom  validity  testing  and  performance  curve,  have  greater  validity  in
identifying malingerers (Bender, 2002). In addition, tests measuring malingering in a
specific domain  could  be  used  to  substantiate  evidence  of feigned  mental  illness
(Rogers,  1997).  One  such  method  would  be  to  focus  additionally  on  cognitive
symptoms  (Halligan,  Bass  &  Oakley,  2003).  Incorporating  a  variety  of  detection
strategies into a  comprehensive test battery heightens the discriminatory power of
the profile.  Such  a test battery would  also  more  likely satisfy the Daubert criteria,
46which outline the standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in court (Horn & 
Denny, 2002).  A brief review of a range of strategies developed by psychologists to 
detect malingering follows.
Floor effects
Floor effect indexes suggests that failure on simple tasks differentiates malingerers 
from  severely impaired  persons who normally answer correctly.  Examples of such 
tests include the Rey 15 Item Memory Test (see Lezak,  1983) and The Wiggins and 
Brandt  Personal  History  Interview  (Wiggins  &  Brandt,  1988).  However,  it  is 
considered  that  the  transparency  of  such  a  technique  does  not  identify  more 
sophisticated  malingerers  (Rogers,  Harrell  &  Liff,  1993).  This  strategy  can  be 
strengthened by adding another approach termed magnitude of error. This approach 
originated with Ganser Syndrome which proposes that proximate answers are more 
likely  of  malingerers  (i.e.  near  misses)  as  they  betray  a  knowledge  of  the  true 
answer.  Research  into  both  ‘near misses’  and  ‘gross  errors’  (e.g.  Bruhn  &  Reed, 
1975)  have identified this as a discriminating  strategy.  A test incorporating  simple 
questions which  require  numeric  responses facilitates  recording  the  magnitude  of 
error whilst simultaneously measuring floor effect.
Forced-choice measures
Forced-choice tests detect malingerers by identifying a pattern of responses that is
significantly  worse  than  chance  responding.  If  a  test  required  a  forced-choice
between two possible responses (e.g. presence or absence of symptoms), then the
chance  responder  would  be  on  average  50%  correct.  The  Test  of  Memory
Malingering (TOMM) (Willison & Tombaugh, 2006) is an example of such a method.
A strength  of this  approach  is  the  lack of alternative  explanations for significantly
below-average  responding.  A relative weakness  is that  in  simulation  designs,  few
simulating  malingerers  score  significantly  below  average  (Rogers,  Harrell  &  Liff,
471993).  Thus,  this  method  tends to  have  low sensitivity with  only the  most  blatant 
malingerers detected.
Symptom validity indices
Self-report measures that contain validity scales designed to detect if respondents 
are  biasing  their responses  are  known  as validity  indices.  Examples  of tests with 
validity scales built into them include the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
- 2 (MMPI-2) (Ben-Porath et al.,  1995), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) 
(Morey,  1991)  and  the  Millon  Clinical  Multiaxial  Inventory-3  (MCMI-III)  (Millon  & 
Meagher, 2004).
Problems  are  encountered  using  self-report  symptom  validity  measures  where 
severely  impaired  psychiatric  patients’  self-appraisal  of  symptomatology  may  be 
influenced  by  their  condition  (Rogers,  1997).  In  some  cases,  ‘true’  patients  may 
endorse symptoms which are not present, thus undermining the theoretical utility of 
measuring psychiatric symptoms to identify malingerers.  In addition, subjective self- 
report measures naturally lend themselves to the potential to malinger, facilitating the 
fabrication process. Halligan, Bass & Oakley (2003) recommend corroborating SVT’s 
with measures tapping specific domains, such as cognitive symptomatology.
2.1.4  Rationale for using cognitive measures to detect malingerers of 
psychiatric illness
Research  has indicated that malingerers of schizophrenia have attempted to feign
cognitive symptoms such as attention, concentration and memory (Clark, 1988). The
cognitive  profile  of  mental  illness  is  less  overtly  observable  than  psychiatric
symptoms  and  therefore  theoretically  less  easy  to  imitate.  In  addition,  cognitive
symptoms  of  mental  illness  are  likely  less  well-known  to  the  lay  person.  This  is
perhaps  because  the  public  are  less  aware  of  preserved  areas  functioning  in
48sufferers  of  severe  impairments,  making  it  harder  to  report  a  constellation  of 
symptoms which are indicative of a genuine deficit. This potentially supports the use 
of cognitive symptom inventories to identify malingerers.
Malingering  is  thought  to  be  an  active  process  requiring  a  significant  amount  of 
cognitive  effort  (Alban,  2003).  Longer  reaction  times  indicate  additional  cognitive 
effort not normally recorded in severely impaired patients. Tasks which tap largely 
preserved  areas  of  functioning  such  as  preattentive  as  opposed  to  effortful 
processing  (Anscombe,  1987)  are  better  placed  to  distinguish  dissimulation. 
Therefore, tests requiring automatic processing which are relatively easily performed 
by those with severe impairments may expose deception by virtue of the time taken 
to suppress a truthful response and generate a false response. An example is the 
Line  Bisection  Task  (LBT)  which  has  been  used  previously  to  differentiate 
malingerers from genuine responders (e.g. Khan et al., 2000) and has support as a 
test which partly requires preserved preattentive processing which, in turn, influences 
performance (Shulman et al., 2002).
2.1.5  Utility of computerised tests of malingering
Timing tasks which require preattentive processing provides a measure of excessive 
cognitive  effort  which  could  potentially  distinguish  malingerers  from  honest 
respondents. Computerising tasks facilitates comparisons between reaction time and 
response  accuracy,  and  has  been  used  successfully  to  improve  detection  of 
symptom  validity  in  forensic  populations  (e.g.  Kertzman-Semion  et  al.,  2006).  In 
addition,  research suggests that deceptive  responses require longer reaction times 
and  are  independent  of  practice  effects  (Vendemia  et  al.,  2005).  At  best, 
computerised  tests  of  information  processing  have  been  shown  to  outperform 
traditional forced-choice measures such as the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) 
(Willison & Tombaugh, 2006).
492.1.6 Strategies used by malingerers
There is very little qualitative investigation into the strategies malingerers use to fake 
tests.  Demonstrating  consistency  has  been  suggested  as  a  response  strategy  on 
cognitive malingering tests (Demarkis,  1999).  Qualitative aspects of malingering on 
memory  tests  have  identified  poor  cooperation,  aggravation,  frustration,  slow 
response times and general  confusion as  potential strategies  used  by malingerers 
(Iverson,  1995). Gaining knowledge of a specific condition, for example, head injury, 
has  been  indicated  as  another  malingering  technique  (Huskey,  2006).  However, 
preparation  has  not  been  found  to  improve  malingering  performance  (Tan  et  al.,
2002).  Strategies  have  been  investigated  to  determine  the  types  of  illness  most 
commonly  feigned  (Cohn,  1995).  No  studies  have  explored  a  link  between  test 
detection strategy and the associated malingering style adopted in response to the 
test malingerers are presented with.
2.1.7 Summary
Research supports the use of a battery of tests to evaluate symptom validity (e.g. 
Rogers,  1997).  A  battery  incorporating  a  test  of  floor  effect,  general  psychiatric 
symptom  validity,  further  investigation  into  a  specific  domain  (e.g.  cognitive 
symptomatology), reaction time to measure excess cognitive effort and magnitude of 
error would  include the  majority  of the  most reliable  methods for the  detection  of 
dissimulation researched to date. Further qualitative investigation into the strategies 
used by malingerers according to the tests they are presented with is needed.
2.1.8 Objectives of Study
The primary aim of the research will be to assess the utility of a battery of cognitive
tests to discriminate malingerers of psychiatric illness from ‘true’ patients and healthy
controls.  The  performance  of  this  battery  will  be  compared  to  a  standardised
instrument,  the  Miller  Forensic  Assessment  of  Symptoms  Test  (M-FAST)  (Miller,
502001), which tests malingering by assessing psychiatric symptoms. Secondary aims 
include:
•  Testing the  performance of three groups  (simulating  malingerers,  true  patients 
and healthy controls) on  a battery of tests presented  by computer designed to 
measure bogus symptom reporting and response style on simple cognitive tests.
•  Comparing the discriminatory power of each of these tests, both individually and 
in  combination  as  a  test  battery,  against  data  from  an  extant  instrument  (M- 
FAST).
•  To assess the degree to which true symptoms are associated with performance 
on the test battery and the M-FAST.
•  To obtain information on the strategies used by simulating malingerers to fake the 
tests.
2.2  Method
2.2.1  Participants
One hundred and five participants were recruited, of which 30 were assigned to the 
healthy  control  group,  40  to  the  simulating  malingering  group  and  35  psychiatric 
inpatients forming the true patient group. Previous research has yielded large effect 
sizes (e.g.  McMennemin,  in preparation).  Regarding the differences between the 3 
groups  on  the  Cognitive  Dysfunctions  Questionnaire  (Coxell),  a  power  calculation 
was performed using the Zumastat 2.3 software. Means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) for the 3 groups were 4.2  (.58), 4.94 (.59) and 6.14 (1)  respectively.Given a pooled standard deviation of 0.75, 17 participants are needed in each group 
in  order to  achieve  a  power  level  of 0.80,  with  a  difference  of 0.74  between  the 
groups at an alpha = 0.05 level of significance. Additional participants were assigned 
to the simulating malingering group to enhance the reliability and validity of additional 
qualitative and quantitative measures administered to this group only.
2.2.2  Sampling
a)  Healthy  control  and  simulating  malingering  groups:  participants  were  recruited 
using opportunity sampling. Inclusion criteria were the same for the 2 groups and are 
listed as follows:
•  Native English speakers
•  No  history  of  severe  mental  illness  (e.g.  Schizophrenia,  Bipolar  Affective 
Disorder)
•  No Learning Disability
•  No history of dyslexia or other reading difficulty
•  No history of severe head injury (loss of consciousness  > 10 minutes)
•  No history of neurological disease (e.g. epilepsy)
•  No visual impairment not corrected by glasses or contact  lenses
b)  Patient  Group:  participants  were  psychiatric  inpatients  recruited  from  acute 
inpatient mental health units across 2 sites of West London Mental Health NHS Trust 
based  at  Charing  Cross  and  Ealing  Hospitals.  Inclusion  criteria  were  applied  as 
follows:
•  Native English speakers
•  A current diagnosis of severe mental illness (e.g. Schizophrenia, Bipolar Affective 
Disorder)
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•  No history of dyslexia or other reading difficulty
•  No history of severe head injury (> 10 minutes unconscious)
•  No history of neurological disease (e.g. epilepsy)
•  No visual impairment not corrected by glasses or contact  lenses
•  No involvement in any medico-legal proceedings (e.g. compensation seeking)
2.2.3  Measures
i) Weschler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) (Wechsler, 2001).
The WTAR is comprised of a list of 50 infrequently used words that the participant 
must pronounce aloud as best as possible. The WTAR has been co-normed against 
the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale  III  (WAIS-III)  (Wechsler,  1997)  and  the 
Wechsler Memory Scale III  (WMS-III) (Wechsler,  1997a),  allowing an estimation of 
pre-morbid  intelligence.  Totalled  raw  scores  are  converted  into  standard  scores 
which can be compared to a UK national normative sample.  Raw scores only were 
used for the purposes of this study, namely to compare intelligence between groups 
rather than to the wider population.
ii) Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis, 1975)
The  BSI  is  a  53-item  self-report questionnaire  identifying  psychiatric  and  medical 
symptoms. Items are rated on a 5-point scale measuring severity from (0) “Not at all” 
to (4) “Extremely”. Respondents are asked to rate the presence of each item over the 
last 7 days. Scoring yields a Global Symptom Index designed to estimate severity of 
psychiatric illness. The questionnaire has been extensively normed against national 
populations  and  various  patient samples.  Reliability  and  validity  of the  instrument 
have  been  tested  in  more  than  400  studies 
(http://www.pearsonassessments.com/tests/bsi.htm).
53iii) Line Bisection Task (LBT) (Schenkenberg et al., 1980).
This  version  consists  of  a  series  of  26  pairs  of  horizontal  lines  which  are  both 
bisected  by  a  vertical  line.  The task  requires  participants  to  identify which  line  is 
bisected closest to the midpoint of the horizontal lines. Bias in estimating the centre 
away from the side neglected is expected in patients with lateral neglect. This task is 
eminently  possible  for most  patients  barring  those with  specific  lesions  in  certain 
areas of the brain. LBT’s are simple tasks which identify malingering by a respondent 
showing inadequate knowledge of how a patient would respond. In addition, the task 
requires little conscious effort and incorporates preattentive processing (Shulman et 
al.,  2002).  Significantly  greater  reaction  times  therefore  may  be  suggestive  of  a 
suppression of the  pre-potent response,  greater cognitive effort and thus serve to 
identify malingerers.
iv) Ganser (created from previous research)
This test is a computerised questionnaire comprising items which require only basic 
knowledge  and  are  normally  answered  correctly  even  by  the  severely  impaired. 
Scoring  incorporates a  magnitude  of error malingering  detection  strategy whereby 
frequent  incorrect answers which  are close  in  proximity to the correct answer are 
hypothesised  to  betray  a  knowledge  of  the  correct  answer,  thus  indicating 
malingering.  Reaction  time  and  participant  responses  are  recorded.  Magnitude  of 
error is computed from the absolute difference between the patient response and the 
correct response.
v) Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ) (Coxell)
This  questionnaire  was  developed  by  Coxell  (McMennemin,  in  preparation).  It 
comprises 69 items of which 7 describe extremely rare symptoms and 22 describe 
fictitious  symptoms.  The  rest  of the  items  are  neutral  and  add  face  validity  as  a
genuine screening tool.  Items that are endorsed  are followed  up after testing  and
54participants were asked to rate the frequency and severity of the symptoms ranging 
from  (1)  “Only  once”  to  (6)  “All  of the  time”  and  (1)  “Not  at  all”  to  (5)  “Severely 
distressing1 1 ,  respectively.  The  computerised  version  automatically  sums  the  total 
score, total reaction time, sum scores of subscales including total distress rating, total 
frequency  rating  and  total  ‘not  sure’  rating.  An  additional  score  was  computed 
summing only the fake and rare items of the measure.
vi) Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) (Miller, 2001).
This measure is a 25-item structured screening interview which provides information 
on  the  probability of the  respondent feigning  psychiatric  illness.  Respondents  are 
asked  whether  they  experience  fictitious  symptoms  which  are  not  commonly 
endorsed  by  genuine  psychiatric  patients.  Scores  are  totalled  according  to  the 
number of items endorsed. A cut-off score of 6 or more is indicative of malingering in 
clinical  settings  (Miller,  2001).  Further information  about  malingering  style  can  be 
gleaned from  subscales which differentiate  amongst malingerers.  The  use  of this 
established screening tool for malingering afforded criterion validity.
vii) Qualitative Questions
After the battery of tests were administered, a series of 6 semi-structured qualitative 
questions  were  directed  to  the  participants  in  the  simulating  malingering  group. 
These questions were designed to:
•  glean qualitative information about the techniques used to malinger.
•  investigate whether the participants were able to distinguish genuine psychiatric 
symptom questions from false ones.
•  give an indication of whether participants altered their strategy when presented 
with tasks utilising different malingering detection approaches.
The following  questions were  asked  and  responses  recorded  in  note form  by the
55principal researcher.
a) How did you respond to the questions to appear mentally ill?
b) Did some questions appear more likely to be genuine symptoms of mental illness 
than others?
c) (If answered 'yes' to (b)) Why did you trust some questions over others?
d) How confident were you about appearing to be mentally ill?
e) What method did you use to malinger?
f) Did you choose a mental illness to malinger, if so which one...?
2.2.4  Design and Procedure
Malingering  research typically  uses a fully controlled  simulation  design  (Schretlen, 
1988). A simulating  malingering group comprised of healthy volunteers is recruited 
and given an incentive (e.g.  monetary) to feign mental illness. Their responses are 
compared to those of a true patient group and a healthy control group. This yields 
data on the malingering and true patient group allowing for discrimination between 
groups.  By  nature  of  their  subterfuge  and  often  current  engagement  in  court 
proceedings, undetected malingerers are impractical to recruit.
All  participants  were  required  to  complete  the  test  battery  in  the  same  order,  as 
follows:
i) WTAR
ii) BSI
iii) LBT
iv) GANSER
v) CDQ
vi) M-FAST
In  addition,  the  simulating  malingering  group  were  then  asked  to  complete  the
56following section:
vi)  Semi-structured qualitative interview
The true patient group and healthy control group were asked to complete all tasks 
honestly. After completing the WTAR and the BSI, the simulating malingering group 
were asked to imagine a scenario in which they were required to convince a court 
that they had a mental illness by the way they responded to the questions on the rest 
of the tasks.
For the sake of consistency and future comparison, the malingering group were given 
the  same  instructions  as  had  been  used  in  a  previous  study  testing  the  CDQ 
(McMennemin, in preparation). These instructions were given as follows:
“I want you to respond to all the subsequent tasks in a way that you believe a person 
with a severe mental illness would. You should try to portray having a serious mental 
illness in as realistic and convincing a manner as you can. Imagine that you are in a 
legal predicament (e.g. you have committed a serious offence) and you believe it is in 
your interest to appear to be seriously mentally ill, and therefore less responsible or 
not responsible for what you have done. Perhaps, for example, you want to appear to 
be unfit to plead at a criminal trial.  I want you to answer all subsequent questions 
about symptoms and to perform all subsequent tasks in this way. The person whose 
scores on  these tests best approximate  those of true patients with severe mental 
illness will be given a prize of £50.  It is therefore in your interests to answer in as 
realistic  and  convincing  a  manner  as  possible.  I  will  not  give  you  any  further 
information at this stage about serious mental illness,  as  I am  interested in your 
perception of this in regard to answering subsequent questions
57The simulating malingerers were given a monetary incentive of £50 to be awarded to 
the most convincing malingerer. This was defined as the participant whose scores on 
the test battery were closest to the average test battery scores of the true patient 
group.
Following completion of the test battery,  participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions  about the  research.  Descriptive  and  raw data  were  entered  into  a 
statistical software package (SPSS).  Raw paper data, consent forms and electronic 
data were stored in accordance with data protection protocols.
2.2.5  Data analyses
Quantitative analyses: Analyses of the data presented in the results section are in the 
following order. Group differences for the demographic information, including gender, 
age,  intelligence measured on the WTAR and symptom reporting measured on the 
BSI are analysed using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), excepting gender 
which is analysed using Chi Square. Levene’s test was used to assess homogeneity 
of variance.  Where  it could  not  be assumed,  a  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric test 
was  used  to  corroborate  findings  from  the  ANOVAs.  Post  hoc  contrasts  were 
computed to investigate differences between pairs of groups.
Criterion validity was assessed  using  an ANOVA on the  M-FAST total score.  This
was computed to investigate whether an established test of malingering differentiated
between groups.  Post hoc contrasts were performed to explore differences between
pairs of groups and Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance to investigate whether
groups  had  comparable  variances.  Where  homogeneity  of variance  could  not  be
assumed,  a  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  test was  computed  to  corroborate  the
ANOVA.  A cut-off of 6 on the  M-FAST was  used  to create a categorical variable,
separating M-FAST scores into 2 groups. A Chi Square test was performed to assess
58differences between groups on this variable.
Outcome variables on the malingering test battery were as follows:
•  LBT total score
•  Ganser total score
•  Ganser mean reaction time score
•  Ganser absolute value score
•  CDQ total time
•  CDQ total score
•  CDQ frequency total
•  CDQ distress total
•  CDQ ‘not sure’ total
•  CDQ combined formula
The  combined  CDQ  formula  was  computed  as  follows:  Total  CDQ  score  for 
malingering  and  rare symptom  items only x  (total frequency score for malingering 
and rare CDQ items x total distress score for malingering and rare CDQ items).
The  Ganser  absolute  value  was  derived  from  the  difference  between  the  correct 
score and the recorded score (regardless of positive or negative values), yielding the 
absolute difference, or magnitude of error score. These were subjected to one-way 
analyses of variance to determine differences between malingering, true patient and 
healthy control groups. Levene’s test was used to assess homogeneity of variance. 
Where it could  not be assumed,  a  Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was  used to 
corroborate  findings  from  the  ANOVAs.  Post  hoc  contrasts  were  computed  to 
investigate differences between pairs of groups.
The outcome variables for the malingering battery were converted into stanine scores
59to  afford  a  simple  ROC  curve  comparison.  For  variables,  CDQ  formula,  Ganser 
absolute total, CDQ fake and rare symptoms total and CDQ distress total, the stanine 
scores were inverted so that for all stanine variables likelihood of malingering was 
positively correlated with stanine score. A Receiver Operating Curve analysis was 
performed  on  the  true  patient  and  simulating  malingering  groups  to  examine 
discriminatory power of the malingering battery. These scores were compared to a 
Receiver  Operating  Curve  analysis  for  the  M-FAST,  an  established  test  of 
malingering.
An  additional  composite  stanine  score  (Total  Stanine)  was  computed  to  create  a 
stanine that represented the malingering battery. The composite stanine consisted of 
the combination of malingering variables which best discriminated between groups. 
CDQ  ‘not  sure’  total  was  excluded  from  the  composite  score  as  the  number  of 
respondents  who  recorded  ‘not  sure’  answers  were  less  than  a  third  of  the 
participants  (N=32).  CDQ  frequency  total  was  also  excluded  from  the  composite 
score  as the  variance  between  groups was  almost double the  mean  (e.g.  for the 
malingering group, mean = 270, s.d.= 433), rendering the discriminatory power of the 
variable unreliable. A maximum stanine score (Max Stanine) was computed from the 
composite  (Total  Stanine)  variable  to  provide  a  variable  which  conflated  all  the 
outcome variables.
The final  section  of the  quantitative  analysis  explored  the  confound  between  true 
pathology,  demographics,  M-FAST and  Total  stanine  score.  Correlations  between 
WTAR, BSI, age, and Total stanine score for the malingering battery are presented 
for the true patient group only. Correlations between WTAR, BSI, age and M-FAST 
scores are also presented for the true patient group only.
Qualitative analyses: A semi structured interview explored the strategies simulating
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elicitation technique yielding discrete categories. This technique requires selecting 3 
participant answers  at  random.  The 2 which  are the  most similar are  matched to 
determine  the  characteristic  of  the  category.  The  third  is  returned  to  the  pool  of 
answers  and  the  process  is  repeated  until  no  further  categories  can  be  elicited 
(Postlethwaite & Jaspars, 1986).
Questions  1   (How did you  respond to the questions to appear mentally ill?) and 5 
(What method did  you  use  to  malinger?)  sought to elicit  information  pertaining to 
techniques used to malinger. On analysis, 7 strategies were elucidated from question 
1. Analysis of question 5 yielded malingering styles which fitted the same categories 
as question 1, lending further support to the systematic use of these techniques.
Questions 2 (Did some questions appear to be more like mental illness than others?) 
and 3 (If so, why did you trust some questions over others?) regarded the apparent 
genuineness of the questions.
Question 4 (How confident were you about appearing to be mentally ill) investigated 
participants  degree  of  confidence  in  feigning  on  the  tests.  Question  6  (Did  you 
choose a mental illness to malinger, if so which one...?) explored the mental illness 
profile that respondents chose to portray.
2.2.6  Ethics
Following  application  for and  receipt of appropriate  ethical  approval  (Appendix  1), 
each participant was presented with an information sheet (Appendix 2) detailing the 
research aims, the right to withdraw at any point without consequence, their voluntary 
participation and what taking part involved. Consent to participate was recorded on a 
consent form (Appendix 3).2.3  Results
2.3.1  Demographics
Means  and  standard  deviations  of  demographic  variables  for  malingering,  true 
patient and healthy control groups are displayed in Table 1. Means are reported with 
standard deviations in parentheses, excepting sex, which is reported as number in 
each group with percentage of group membership in parentheses.
Table 1: Group demographic means and standard deviations
Variable
Malingering
Groups
True Patient Healthy Control
Sex
Male 17 (42.5%) 21 (60%) 17 (56.7%)
Female 23 (57.5%) 14 (35%) 13 (43.3%)
Age* 31.5 (8.3) 37.9(11.3) 26.8(11.1)
WTAR* 40.5 (6.7) 35.2 (8.3) 46.2 (3.5)
BSI* 22.8 (25.4) 76.2 (56.4) 6.5 (8.9)
Note: ^Significant at/7 < 0.01, otherwise NS
Sex did  not differ significantly between the groups  (X = 2.60;  df=2;  NS).  One-way 
analyses of variance found significant differences between groups according to age 
(F(2,102)  = 9.67,  p < 0.01),  pre-morbid  intelligence  measured on the WTAR  (F(2, 
102)  = 22.15,  p <  0.01)  and  self-report of psychiatric symptomatology on the  BSI 
(F(2,102) = 33.73, p< 0.01).
Post-hoc tests found that differences between groups according to age were due to 
difference  between  true  patient  and  healthy  control  groups  (p  <  0.01)  and 
malingering  and  true  patient  groups  (p  <  0.01)  but  not  malingering  and  healthy 
control groups.  Differences  between  groups according to a pre-morbid estimate ofintelligence found that all groups were significantly different (p < 0.01).  Differences 
between  groups  according  to  self-reported  psychiatric  symptomatology  also found 
that all groups differed significantly on the BSI (p < 0.01).
Homogeneity  of variance  was  assessed  using  Levene’s  test  and  found  that  age, 
WTAR  and  BSI  equality  of  variance  could  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non- 
parametric  tests  corroborated  the  analyses  of  variance  findings  that  there  were 
significant differences between groups according to age, BSI and WTAR scores, but 
not sex.
2.3.2  Distinguishing between groups
A one-way analysis of variance showed that the M-FAST successfully discriminated 
between groups (F(2, 102) = 60.22; p < 0.01) (see table 2). Post hoc analyses found 
all  groups differed  significantly from  each  other.  Levene’s test for homogeneity  of 
variance indicated equal variance should  not be assumed and so a Kruskal-Wallis 
non-parametric  test  was  performed  to  corroborate  the  analysis  of variance  {%2  = 
63.77; df = 2; p < 0.01).
Table 2: Means and standard deviations for the M-FAST
Variable Mean Standard deviation
M-FAST total score
Malingerers* 12.8 5.3
True patients* 5.2 5.7
Healthy controls* 0.7 1.2
Note: * denotes significance at p < 0.01
A categorical variable was computed using the recommended cut-off of a total score 
of 6 to indicate malingering. There was a strong association between being classified 
as a malingerer and membership of the malingering group (x2 = 59.93; df = 2;  p < 
0.01). Eleven participants in the true patient group were classified as malingerers, 36 
in the simulating malingering group and none in the healthy control group (see table
633). This equates to 31% of true patients being classified as malingerers, which is just 
over the upper limit of expected percentages of malingerers in psychiatric patients.
Table 3: Classification of malingering on the M-FAST
Group  Classified as malingerers Classified as non­
malingerers
Malingerers  36 4
True patients  11 29
Healthy controls  0 40
2.3.3  Group differences on tests of malingering
The following section displays results from these analyses ordered by variable.
LBT total score
Mean LBT total scores differed significantly between groups (F(2,  102) = 32.31, p < 
0.01), (figure 1).
Post-hoc analyses found significant differences  between  all  pairs  of group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.05; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and  malingerers  Vs true  patients,  p <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
made significantly more errors than both the true patient and healthy control groups 
on the LBT.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were 
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on LBT total score.
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Mean Ganser total scores differed significantly between groups (F(2,  101) = 52.53,  p 
<0.01), (figure 2).
Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
made significantly more errors than  both the true patient and healthy control groups 
on the Ganser.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were
65computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on Ganser total score.
Figure 2: Mean Ganser total scores by group
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Mean  Ganser mean  reaction time scores differed  significantly between groups  (F(2, 
100) = 22.78, p < 0.01), (figure 3).
Post-hoc analyses indicated significant differences between all pairs of group means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  Unexpectedly,  the  true  patient  group 
took  longer to  complete  the  Ganser than  the  other  2  groups.  However,  simulating 
malingerers took significantly longer than healthy controls, as expected.
Maling  Patient  Healthy Control
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variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were 
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding  of 
significant differences between groups on Ganser mean reaction time score.
Figure 3: Mean Ganser mean reaction time scores by group
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The  data  were  not  suitable  for  parametric testing.  A  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric 
test found significant differences between groups (*2 = 42.79;  df = 2;  p < 0.01).  Both 
gross  errors  and  proximal  answers  are  indicative  of  malingering  for  this  variable. 
Thus,  any significant deviation from the correct score suggests malingering.  Extreme 
variance in scores makes these data hard to interpret graphically. Table 4 reports the
67means and standard deviations.
Table 4: Ganser absolute magnitude of error means and standard deviations by group
Group Mean Standard deviation
Malingerers 118101 73005897
True patients 41.6 88.7
Healthy controls 0.5 1.9
CDQ total score
Mean CDQ total scores differed significantly between groups (F(2,  102) = 60.75,  p < 
0.01), (figure 4).
Figure 4: Mean CDQ total scores by group 
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Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means
68(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and  malingerers  Vs true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
reported significantly more cognitive symptoms than both the true patient and healthy 
control groups.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were 
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on CDQ total score.
CDQ total time
Mean CDQ total time scores differed significantly between groups (F(2, 91) = 36.09, 
p < 0.01), (figure 6).
Post-hoc  analyses found  significant differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and malingerers Vs true patients, p < 0.01). The true patients took significantly longer 
to complete the CDQ than the other 2 groups, which is unexpected as malingering 
requires  more  cognitive  effort  and  is  predicted  to  take  longer.  However,  the 
simulating  malingerers took significantly longer than  the  healthy control  group,  as 
expected.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were 
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on CDQ total time.
69Figure 5: Mean CDQ total time scores by group
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CDQ total fake and rare items score
Mean  CDQ  total  fake  and  rare  items  scores  differed  significantly  between  groups 
(F(2,  102) = 56.95, p < 0.01), (figure 6).
Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients,  p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls,  p < 0.01 
and  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
reported  significantly  more  fake  and  rare  cognitive  symptoms  than  both  the  true 
patient and healthy control groups.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  werecomputed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on CDQ total fake and rare items score.
Figure 6: Mean CDQ total fake and rare items scores by group
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CDQ total frequency score
Mean CDQ total frequency scores differed significantly between groups (F(2,  102) = 
7.04, p< 0.01), (figure 7).
Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  2  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
but  not  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  NS).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
reported  suffering significantly more frequent cognitive symptoms than  both the true 
patient and healthy control groups.
71Figure 7: Mean CDQ total frequency scores by group
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Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  2  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
but  not  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  NS).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
reported  suffering  significantly  more  frequent  cognitive  symptoms  than  the  healthy 
control group.
CDQ total distress score
Mean  CDQ  total  distress  scores  differed  significantly  between  groups  (F(2,  102)  = 
25.20, p < 0.01), (figure 8).
72Figure 8: Mean CDQ total distress scores by group
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Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.01; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01;
and  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers
reported  suffering  significantly  more  distressful  cognitive  symptoms  than  both  the
true patient and healthy control groups.
Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of
significant differences between groups on CDQ total distress score.
Maling  Patient  Healthy Control
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73CDQ total ‘not sure’ score
Mean  CDQ total  ‘not sure’  scores differed significantly  between  groups (F(2,  102)  = 
12.14, p<0.01), (figure 9).
Figure 9: Mean CDQ total ‘not sure’ scores by group
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Post-hoc  analyses  found  significant  differences  between  all  pairs  of  group  means 
(healthy controls Vs true patients, p < 0.05; malingerers Vs healthy controls, p < 0.01; 
and  malingerers  Vs  true  patients,  p  <  0.01).  As  expected,  simulating  malingerers 
reported not being sure of experiencing  some cognitive symptoms significantly more 
often  than  both  the  true  patient  and  healthy  control  groups.  However,  numbers  of 
respondents who used the ‘not sure’ option were less than a third of the participants 
(N=32).
74Levene’s test was computed to determine homogeneity of variance and found equal 
variance  should  not  be  assumed.  Kruskal-Wallis  non-parametric  tests  were 
computed to corroborate the analyses of variance and supported the initial finding of 
significant differences between groups on CDQ total ‘not sure’ score.
CDQ combined formula score
(See  Method  data analysis section for an  explanation  of  included variables  in the 
CDQ combined formula).
Mean CDQ total scores did not differ significantly between groups (F(2,102) = 0.89, 
NS) on a one-way analysis of variance.  Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance 
found equal variance should not be assumed. A Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test 
found significant differences between groups  {%2 = 65.10; df = 2; p < 0.01).  Means 
and standard deviations are reported in Table 5.
Table 5: CDQ combined formula means and standard deviations by group
Group Mean Standard deviation
Malingerers 41573 244170
True patients 2150 10309
Healthy controls 0.0005 0.003
Although simulating  malingerers  reported a combination of number, frequency and 
distress of cognitive symptoms to a significantly greater degree than  both the true 
patient  and  healthy  control  groups,  a  parametric  test  did  not  find  this  difference 
significant. It is possible that this combined formula does not successfully distinguish 
between groups on an ANOVA due to the extreme variance caused by the range of 
responses in the malingering group. Some malingerers recorded the most extreme 
response for all items, whereas others were more parsimonious in their responding. 
This yielded a variance almost 6 times that of the mean score (mean = 41573; s.d. = 
244170).
752.3.4  Receiver operating curve (ROC) analyses
Table 6 reports the area under curve statistic yielded from receiver operating curve 
analyses for all malingering variables.
Table 6: Area under ROC statistics for stanine malingering variables
Area under curve statistic
Stanine variable
Confidence interval (95%)
M-FAST 0.83 0.74 - 0.94
LBT total* 0.81 0.70 - 0.91
Ganser time total* 0.71 0.60 - 0.83
Ganser total* 0.83 0.73 - 0.93
Ganser absolute total* 0.75 0.64 - 0.87
CDQ frequency total 0.71 0.59 - 0.83
CDQ distress total* 0.75 0.64 - 0.87
CDQ fake & rare total* 0.83 0.73 - 0.92
CDQ ‘not sure’ total 0.64 0.51 - 0.76
CDQ total* 0.76 0.64 - 0.87
CDQ formula* 0.78 0.68 - 0.89
Total stanine 
Maximum stanine
0.93
0.92
0.87 - 0.98 
0.85 - 0.98
Note:  ‘Variables  used  to  compute  Total  stanine  and  Maximum  stanine  variables  (see 
rationale for including these variables in Method data analysis section).
As can be seen from figures 10 and 11, the Total Stanine variable outperformed the 
M-FAST  in  discriminating  between  inpatients  and  simulating  malingerers.  ROC 
analysis  of  the  M-FAST  stanine  (Figure  10)  scores  for  the  true  patient  and 
malingering groups yielded a significant Area Under Curve (AUC) statistic suggestive 
of high discriminatory power (AUC = 0.83; 95% Cl: 0.74 - 0.94; p < 0.01). The AUC 
statistic corresponds to the likelihood of identifying a malingerer over a true patient 
according to M-FAST score.
76Figure 10: M-FAST Receiver Operating Curve
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Figure 11: Total stanine Receiver Operating Curve
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77ROC  analysis  of  the  Total  Stanine  variable  for the  true  patient  and  malingering 
groups yielded a significant Area Under Curve (AUC) statistic suggestive of superior 
discriminatory power (AUC = 0.93; 95% Cl: 0.87 - 0.98; p < 0.01). The AUC statistic 
corresponds to the likelihood of identifying a malingerer over a true patient according 
to Total Stanine score.  ROC analysis of the Total  Stanine variable is presented in 
Figure 11.
2.3.5  Relationship  between  true  pathology,  age,  intelligence and  malingering 
indices
Parametric  correlations  were  performed  to  indicate  whether  descriptive  variables, 
WTAR, age and BSI confounded with the combined malingering score and M-FAST. 
Table 7 presents the correlation coefficients for these analyses. These correlations 
were performed on the true patient group only. To control for the likelihood of making 
a Type 1   error, a Bonferroni test was performed, setting significance at the alpha = 
0.008 level.
Age and WTAR scores did not correlate between the Total stanine variable or the M- 
FAST. True pathology measured on the BSI correlated positively with the M-FAST.
Table 7: Correlations between demographic variables, M-FAST and Total stanine score
Demoaraohics
Variable Age WTAR BSI
M-FAST r = -0.21 r = -0.30 r = 0.54*
Total stanine r = 0.03 r = 0.32 r = -0.61*
Note:  * significant association at p < 0.008
Interestingly,  true  pathology  correlated  negatively  with  Total  stanine  score.  This 
finding suggests that the more severely ill patients were less likely to be classed as 
malingering according to the Total stanine variable.
782.3.6  Qualitative analysis
Analysis of the qualitative data revealed the use of a number of malingering 
strategies.
2.3.6.1  Malingering techniques
Respondents  reported  using  a  combination  of  malingering  techniques,  adjusting 
styles to particular tests and changing techniques during a single task. The strategies 
are described as follows.
Suppression:
Five interviewees described suppressing honest responses and substituting 
opposing fabricated answers in order to convey abnormality.
“...Said the opposite of what I would normally.”
“...Difficult acting not what you are. Knowing not putting the correct answer.”
Interviewees alluded to the cognitive effort required to suppress the pre-potent 
honest response.
Subtlety:
Ten interviewees expressed an attempt to convey mental illness more convincingly 
by not over-exaggerating their responses.
“Not to be too obvious, not answering yes to all symptoms.”
“Taking the norm and slightly deviating from it, not too obviously.”
A sophisticated form of this technique was used by 2 people to confound the tests by 
conveying preserved ability“...Ganser truthfully, if got mental health problems, it doesn’t mean memory
deficit.”
Imitation
Fourteen  respondents attempted to  mimic mental  illness  by exaggerating  personal 
experiences  or  drawing  on  information  gleaned  from  popular  culture  or  general 
knowledge.
“If had own experience, tried to use that, something that might happen to me 
and exaggerate it.”
“I imagined giving myself an ailment.”
“Based on knowledge, popular knowledge, erratic, e.g. ‘12 Monkeys'.” 
Random patterns
Sixteen respondents described using a technique which ignored the content of the 
questions and sought to portray abnormality by answering using a random pattern or 
formula.
“...LBT just one button, then swapped...”
“Press the same button a lot, then stop and think on occasion.”
Several of these respondents referred to using this technique on the LBT where the 
function of the test was less transparent.
“...First test random as couldn’t work it out.”
80Consistency
Fourteen interviewees reported attempting to respond consistently across and within 
symptom inventories. This strategy was explained by some as a means of minimising 
the likelihood of contradicting oneself and presenting a cluster of symptoms indicative 
of a particular problem.
“...Remember what had done before to answer accordingly and appear 
realistic.”
“I tried to recall patterns in the subject of the questions to have continuity and 
not be  completely random. I thought the questions might be designed to pick 
holes, so I tried to keep continuity.”
Inconsistency
Five participants included an element of randomness to their responding to reflect 
erratic behaviour that they believed was indicative of mental illness.
“Mix of contradictory symptoms deliberately, being illogical and inconsistent.” 
“Like I was confused about what being asked.”
Global impairment
Four respondents answered yes to most symptom questions, believing that those 
with mental illness suffer global impairment.
“I answered yes to everything.”
“Something wrong with every single one of me, everything.”
2.3.6.2  Determining the veracity of the questions
82.5% (33) of simulating malingerers believed that some questions appeared more
81likely to be symptoms of mental  illness than  others.  12.5% (5) thought that all the 
questions  were  genuine  symptoms  of mental  illness  and  5%  (2)  were  unsure.  In 
trying to decipher genuine symptoms from bogus questions, participants reported the 
following intuitions.
Guesswork
Two respondents said they guessed.
Patterns
Two respondents believed that the more questions pertained to a particular 
symptom, the more likely it was genuine.
“See patterns from what asked...e.g. ‘ringing in ears’  was asked twice, 
therefore was  more likely to be real.”
Obscure
Four participants reported being more wary of questions which appeared too 
unusual.
“...obvious trick ones, e.g. voices from right or left ear. Some were 
transparent, too obscure.”
Stereotypes
Eighteen participants relied on their knowledge of mental health problems to guide 
their responding.
“Some were more obvious, e.g. stuff you’ve read in books or see in movies.”
“Some seemed like true questions based on my knowledge.”
82Normality
Twelve respondents endorsed questions which appeared closer to normal 
experience.
“Some happen to me even when normal. For example 'temper1 , 'yes’ to these 
More normal experiences.”
“Some were closer to normality, for example, balance and memory might be 
exacerbated in mental illness. Or if had bothered me before.”
Ninety  percent  of  respondents  (36)  reported  not  being  confident  in  appearing 
mentally  ill,  suggesting  that the test  battery was  not transparent.  Ten  percent  (4) 
reported a high degree of confidence in responding as if they had a mental illness. 
Fifty-five percent (22) of simulating malingerers did not choose a particular illness to 
malinger.  Of  those  that  did,  25%  chose  to  portray  a  psychotic  illness  (e.g. 
schizophrenia), 5% chose depression, 7.5% (3) attempted to convey psychopathy or 
personality disorders and the remaining 7.5% (3) selected a neurological disorder to 
malinger.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1  General discussion
The study aimed to assess the utility of a battery of tests to discriminate simulating 
malingerers from true patients and healthy controls. The test battery’s performance 
was  compared  to  that  of  an  established  malingering  screening  tool,  the  M-FAST 
(Miller, 2001). The individual tests forming the battery were examined individually and 
in  combination  for their discriminatory  power.  The  extent to which true  symptoms 
were associated with test performance was explored to give an indication of potential
83confounds.  The  research  also  used  a  semi-structured  interview to  investigate  the 
strategies simulating malingerers employed to appear mentally ill.
2.4.2 Utility of the malingering battery
In combination, the test battery outperformed an established screening tool, the M- 
FAST (Miller, 2001),  in distinguishing between simulating malingerers, true patients 
and healthy controls. This supports the notion that tests utilising a variety of detection 
strategies increase the likelihood of identifying malingerers (Bender, 2002). It lends 
support to the value of cognitive malingering tests over psychiatric symptom reporting 
in the detection of malingering (e.g. Horn & Denny, 2002).
Individually,  the  LBT  total  score,  the  Ganser total  score,  the  CDQ fake  and  rare 
symptoms  score  and  the  M-FAST  test  score  performed  with  commensurate 
discriminatory power.  A test of floor effect, measured on the Ganser, self-report of 
cognitive  symptomatology  measured  on  the  CDQ  and  cognitive  performance 
incorporating preattentive  processing measured on the LBT discriminated between 
groups as successfully as a self-report test of general psychiatric symptomatology, 
the  M-FAST  (Miller,  2001).  These  individual  results  uphold  claims  of  the 
discriminatory power of the above strategies in detecting malingering (e.g.  Rogers, 
Harrell & Lift, 1993).
2.4.3 Group differences by reaction time
Timing  of  the  Ganser  and  CDQ  did  not  meaningfully  distinguish  simulating
malingerers from true patients. It is hypothesised that the attentional effort required to
read  the  questions  and  respond  rendered  the  results  unhelpful  as  a  detection
strategy. Indeed, some of the true patients took breaks during the testing, or became
84distracted,  which  lengthened  the  time  taken  to  complete  a  task.  This  finding  is 
supported by the literature, which suggests that tasks which require minimal cognitive 
effort  and  tap  preattentive  as  opposed  to  effortful  processing  will  more  likely 
discriminate between malingerers and true patients (e.g. Anscombe, 1987).
2.4.4 Correlations between malingering tests, demographic variables and true 
pathology
BSI scores correlated positively with scores on the M-FAST. This could be explained 
by the theory that severely impaired psychiatric patients’ self-appraisal on symptom 
inventories may be influenced by their condition (Rogers,  1997).  If this is the case, 
then it supports the use of a variety of tasks in addition to symptom reporting so as to 
control for this possibility.
In contrast, true pathology correlated negatively with the combined stanine variable. 
This is an interesting finding suggesting that the more psychiatrically unwell, the less 
likely  to  be  classified  as  malingering  according  to  combined  stanine  score.  This 
opposes  theories  that  suggest  self-report  in  psychiatric  populations  renders 
malingering tools less sensitive (e.g.  Rogers,  1997).  It is unclear from the literature 
why this might be the case.  It is possible that those classified as malingerers in the 
patient group only faked their answers on the cognitive malingering battery and not 
the measures of general psychiatric symptoms (BSI and M-FAST). If this is the case, 
then it would lend further support to using cognitive malingering tests in addition to 
measures of general psychiatric symptoms. This could potentially overturn a criticism 
of  using  self-report  approaches  in  psychiatric  populations  and  certainly  warrants 
further investigation.
2.4.5 Qualitative investigation of malingering response styles
Simulating  malingerers reported using a variety of strategies to fake the tests. The
85strategies were employed in response to the demands of the different tests, but were 
also switched during an individual task. For example, strategies subtlety and imitation 
selectively endorsed  symptoms which  the  respondents felt were  more  likely to be 
genuine  symptoms  of  mental  illness.  If  self-report  general  psychiatric 
symptomatology was the only detection strategy used, then it would be less likely to 
identify simulating malingerers who used this response style. This is corroborated by 
speculation that a weakness of floor effect strategies is that they are not sufficient to 
identify more sophisticated malingerers (Rogers, Harrell & Liff, 1993). This qualitative 
finding lends further weight to the use of multiple detection strategies to discriminate 
malingerers.
Certain  malingering  techniques  lent  qualitative  support  to  the  use  of  a  particular 
detection  strategy.  For  example,  the  response  style  suppression  described  the 
effortful  processing  required  to  suppress  an  honest  response  and  substitute  an 
opposing  fabricated  answer.  However,  the  quantitative  results  suggest  that  this 
detection strategy is rendered indiscriminating when there is additional effort required 
to read the questions. Therefore tasks which require a high proportion of preattentive 
as opposed to effortful  processing will  more likely detect malingerers from patients 
via timing detection strategies, a finding supported by the literature (e.g. Anscombe, 
1987; Vendemia et al., 2005).
Simulating malingerers alluded to attempts to convey consistency in their responses,
by endorsing similar deficits within and across tests of self-report symptomatology.
Respondents  indicated  the  difficulty  in  remembering  what  they  had  endorsed  to
remain consistent. These participants were more likely to endorse similar symptoms
if they  had  responded  positively to  them  in  prior questions.  This  emphasises  the
value  of  using  self-report symptom  inventories  which  incorporate  questions  about
fake  symptoms  and  genuine  symptoms  in  a  specific  domain  of  functioning.  The
86qualitative findings suggest that this technique will be strengthened if the questions 
are about lesser-known deficits in mental illness, such as cognitive functioning. This 
is supported by Halligan, Bass & Oakley (2003) who suggest using inventories which 
question functioning in specific domains, such as cognitive symptomatology.
The majority of the simulating malingerers did not select a specific illness to malinger. 
This is perhaps an indication that the respondents had not prepared a presentation to 
malinger.  A touted  shortcoming  of simulation  designs  is the  reduced  incentive  to 
malinger compared to that of genuine malingerers (e.g.  Rogers,  1997). This finding 
lends  further support to  the  potential  difference  in  presentation  of simulating  and 
genuine malingerers.
2.4.6 Strengths, limitations and future research
A strength of this research is the superior discriminatory power of a battery of tests to 
identify  dissimulation.  The  test  battery  is  underpinned  by  several  theories  about 
different  detection  strategies  which  are  more  likely  to  distinguish  malingerers.  In 
addition,  these  detection  theories  are  corroborated  by  qualitative  findings  which 
indicate  that  different  malingering  styles  will  more  likely  be  identified  by  certain 
detection  strategies.  However,  the findings are only an  indication of the strategies 
that simulating malingerers employ and cannot be considered wholly representative 
of the genuine malingering population. Although there is qualitative support for timing 
tasks  to  detect  dissimulation,  the  quantitative  findings  did  not  utilise  this  strategy 
successfully.
The  comparison  true  patient  group  comprised  participants  who  were  admitted  to 
inpatient  wards  in  crisis.  A  proportion  of this  group  were  in  intensive  care  units. 
Considering  that  problems  are  anticipated  when  using  self-report  symptom 
inventories  where  severely  impaired  psychiatric  patients’  self-appraisal  ofsymptomatology  may  be  influenced  by  their  condition  (Rogers,  1997),  the 
discriminatory power of the test battery is all the more significant.
This  study  has  given  an  indication  that  specific  malingering  techniques  might  be 
more likely identified by certain detection strategies. Future research investigating the 
relationship  between  response  style  and  detection  strategy  could  improve  the 
development of test batteries to distinguish dissimulation. This research should be 
repeated with at risk malingering populations in order to enhance the generalisability 
of the findings. Timing tasks to identify malingering by virtue of excess cognitive effort 
needs  further  investigation  using  tasks  of  preattentive  processing  to  minimise 
extraneous  variability  produced  by  effortful  processing  required  on  self-report 
inventories.
This research has practical relevance for clinical and forensic psychologists. With the 
growing number of cases which require an assessment of malingering, psychologists 
need to move towards an established gold standard of assessment of dissimulation, 
achievable only through research. This study has indicated that a screening tool such 
as  the  M-FAST  should  be  supported  by  additional  tests  of  malingering  which 
incorporate  a  variety  of  detection  strategies.  This  practical  requirement  was 
illustrated by 30% of psychiatric inpatients scoring over the cut-off for malingering on 
the M-FAST. This emphasises the benefit of exploring the accuracy of cut-offs on a 
screening tool by using a more comprehensive battery of malingering tests to avoid 
false positives.
Furthermore,  empirically validated  measures of malingering are required to protect 
against the economic and risk-related consequences of false negatives,  particularly 
in criminal proceedings. It would be premature to provide cut-offs on the malingering 
tests on the strength of this research. From a practical point of view, clinicians needrecommended  cut-offs  to  be  able  to  make  a  categorical  judgement  about 
malingering.  Further  research  would  be  useful  in  identifying  cut-off values for the 
malingering battery which would be applicable in different settings.  Future research 
could  evaluate  the  utility  of  this  battery  of  tests  further  by  comparing  to  a  gold 
standard instrument such as the Stuctured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) 
(Rogers,  Bagby & Dickens,  1992),  which  investigates malingering  more stringently 
than the M-FAST screening tool. Finally, with the expected introduction of a protocol 
for the  admissibility  of scientific evidence,  research  into empirically validated tools 
with  sufficient  and  explicatory  discriminatory  power  is  necessary  if  tests  of 
malingering are to stand up to potential Daubert-standard challenges in court.
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95Part 3: Critical Appraisal
This paper reflects on the research undertaken and reported in this thesis volume. It 
covers themes including the generalisability of the findings when using a simulating 
malingering  design,  the  utility  of  measuring  reaction  time  to  detect  malingering, 
difficulties in the recruitment of inpatients, the array of choices in selecting the test 
battery and the clinical applications of the research.
3.1  Generalisability in simulation designs:
Although the majority of studies utilise a simulation design and this is recognised as 
the  standard  method  for  studying  malingering  (e.g.  Rogers,  1997),  the  major 
limitation of this approach is the generalisability of the findings. The simulating group 
in the current study were offered a monetary incentive to feign illness. However, this 
motivation  is  not  considered  comparable  to  the  significant  incentive  genuine 
malingerers may experience in order to receive compensation or influence outcome 
in a criminal trial. During the testing phase, some of the simulating malingering group 
gave the impression that, whilst they may have enjoyed the process, they were not 
seen to demonstrate seriousness in  presenting a persuasive profile of illness.  This 
observation  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  simulating  malingerers  are  far  from 
comparable to true life malingers in their motivation to feign.
A related drawback became apparent when testing the simulating group. In recruiting 
participants,  it  was  necessary  in  some  cases  to  provide  advance  warning,  if,  for 
example, the researcher was booking in time to see people at their workplace. As a 
result,  some  participants  may  have  known  the  purpose  of the  study  a  month  in 
advance  and  others  may  have  not  known  until  immediately  before  testing.  This 
created differences  in the opportunity to prepare a response style.  One participant
mentioned  researching  a condition to improve the profile of responses. This would
96not have been possible to do for some participants.  It is considered that this is an 
additional weakness in the design and that the simulating malingering group should 
all be provided with advance warning of the study aims so as to allow the opportunity 
to research mental illness, if they so choose.
Within those  simulators  who  had the opportunity to  research  mental  illness,  there 
appeared to be differences in the amount of preparation that participants engaged in. 
This was not asked explicitly and on  reflection may be a useful point of inquiry for 
qualitative research. However, it would support the notion that there is heterogeneity 
in  response styles of malingerers, who may vary significantly in the approach they 
take prior to the testing process. As Pankratz & Binder (1997)  contended, there may 
be differences in the nature of malingering according to the level of understanding of 
the condition one is attempting to feign.
Generalisability remains a significant problem for malingering research and tests of 
malingering should be replicated using an at risk malingering group. Nevertheless, a 
comparative  strength  of  this  research  design  was  the  inclusion  of  a  clinical 
comparison group. A substantial amount of research using a simulating design only 
use a simulating group and a healthy control group (Rogers, 1997). These designs do 
not explore the  possibility that the differences in  simulating  malingerers would  not 
also be found in patient groups. The interpretation of the findings from this study are 
therefore strengthened by the inclusion of a clinical comparison.
3.2  The utility of reaction time as a discriminating variable
Reaction time is suggested to be a effective method for detecting malingerers (e.g.
Vendemia et al., 2005). The method is made more attractive by virtue of the difficulty
in faking reaction time. If malingering requires a significant amount of cognitive effort
(Alban,  2003),  then  tasks  which  require  little  effortful  processing  may  expose
97malingerers by the added time it takes to initiate a malingered response. This idea 
has  been  of  interest  since  Wertheimer &  Klein’s  (1904)  experiments  and yet  has 
rarely been demonstrated successfully (e.g. Vendemia et al., 2005). This is possibly 
because there are extraneous factors which create additional variability in this fine 
measurement.
During the testing, the most noticeable difficulties emerged when administering the 
timed tasks to the inpatient group. Extraneous factors which rendered reaction time 
ineffective on the test battery included the length of time the test takes to complete. 
The longer a measure is, the harder it is for a patient to maintain concentration and 
the  more  likely distractions will  occur.  This was  noted on several occasions when 
patients broke off from the task to engage in conversation, stop for a break or leave 
the  room for unspecified  reasons.  Timing tasks which  require significant cognitive 
effort may also render this detection strategy insensitive.  Having to read questions 
requires effort and  also creates  variance according to  reading  speed.  Longer and 
more complex questions created more variance. Patients took significantly longer on 
all tests which measured reaction time.
The Line Bisection Test (LBT) had the most potential to discriminate malingerers by 
reaction time.  Due to programming difficulties, the task was not timed in this study. 
However,  during the testing  process,  a qualitative observation  indicated that most 
inpatients  maintained  concentration  during  the  LBT and  completed  it  swiftly.  This 
maybe due to the little cognitive effort required to answer each item.  Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the LBT is predominantly a test of preattentive processing, with 
the demands of each item processed automatically and the only effortful requirement 
being to find the centre of the line (Shulman et al., 2002). The LBT was also the first 
computerised task in the test battery and so levels of concentration may have been 
higher at this point.
98In  summary,  the  research  has  corroborated  earlier  findings  that  reaction  time 
requires fine measurement. Processes which may improve the discriminatory power 
of reaction time include administering reaction time tasks at the beginning of a test 
battery,  using tasks which have a low number of items and, most importantly, using 
tasks which require minimal effortful processing.
3.3  Patient group
The clinical group were recruited from inpatient acute psychiatric units in order to be 
sure  of approaching  potential  participants  who  had  a  diagnosis  of severe  mental 
illness. The principle reason for using a clinical comparison group is to ensure that 
differences  in  the  simulating  malingering  group  are  not  replicated  by  patient with 
genuine  mental  health  problems  (Rogers,  1997).  It  has  also  been  suggested that 
patients  with  severe  mental  illness  may  not  report  their  symptoms  accurately 
(Rogers,  1997).  It  is  therefore  important  to  include  patients  with  severe 
symptomatology to ensure that the test battery distinguishes simulating malingerers 
from patients with erratic reporting styles.
On some wards,  sampling  selectively recruited patients who were less severely ill. 
Ward staff warned the researcher about approaching patients who were particularly 
unwell.  Of those approached, the less severely ill  patients appeared more likely to 
consent to the testing than the more unwell. There may be a combination of reasons 
for this. Less well patients may not have felt able to commit to an hour of testing, they 
may  have  not  wanted  to  engage  with  a  researcher  who  they  viewed  as  a 
representative of the  NHS and they may have  been suspicious of the aims of the 
research.  The  latter  point should  be  considered  in  the wording  of the  information 
sheet.
Some  patients with  psychosis questioned the  integrity of the  research  and voiced
99suspicion  that  the  research  was  evaluating  the  veracity  of  their  symptoms. 
Reassurances  provided  by the  researcher were  not always sufficient to allay their 
fears.  It  is  possible  that  mention  of  malingering  or the  genuineness  of symptom 
reporting  activated  paranoia  in  some  patients.  Although  there  were  no  visible 
repercussions as a result of approaching patients during the course of this research, 
it  remains  possible  that  the  nature  of  the  research  could  unsettle  patients  with 
paranoia.  Researchers  have  an  ethical  obligation  to  remain  explicit  about  the 
research  aims  and  can  continue to stress their voluntary participation  and  right to 
withdraw at any point,  should patients become disturbed before, during or after the 
testing.
As a result, the inpatient group is at risk of consisting of the less severe patients on 
wards.  However,  a  strength  of this research was that recruitment spanned several 
units (totalling more than  14 wards).  Included in these were patients recruited from 
two intensive care units.  Patients on these wards were often highly aroused and in 
crisis. The researcher approached patients with trepidation, and although the ratio of 
positive responses to  participate were lower,  several patients on these wards took 
part in the research. Participants from the most severe inpatient units were therefore 
included in the patient group. On balance, the degree of illness severity is considered 
adequate to be representative of inpatients in the psychiatric system.  Researchers 
should  be  aware  of the  potential  to  be  directed  away from  the  more  severely  ill 
patients  and  can  compensate  for  this  by  visiting  high  dependency  wards  and 
questioning ward staff about the patients they can approach.
3.4  Test battery selection
A strength of the research lay in the range of detection strategies included in the test 
battery.  Rogers,  Harrell & Liff (1993) emphasised the importance of incorporating a
variety  of  malingering  measures  to  heighten  discriminatory  power.  All  detection
100strategies,  excepting  reaction  time,  successfully  distinguished  between  groups. 
However, it was the combined test results that differentiated most powerfully between 
groups. Ideas for improving reaction time detection are provided above.
This  research  did  not use a  performance curve technique  in the test battery.  This 
could  possibly  improve  detection  further  as  performance  curve  measures  receive 
positive reviews of their discriminatory power (Rogers, Harrell & Liff, 1993). However, 
there is a trade off in selecting a battery of tests between the time taken to administer 
them and the discriminatory power. The length of the test battery will have an impact 
on the uptake of this method in clinical practice. Whilst the test battery outperformed 
an  established  screening  tool  in  distinguishing  simulating  malingerers,  the 
administration  time  was  on  average  approximately  45  minutes,  compared  to  5 
minutes  for  the  screening  tool.  Clinicians  will  be  mindful  of  this  when  selecting 
malingering  measures  in  practice.  However,  in  thorough  investigations  of 
malingering, for example, for court reports, clinicians may well prefer to use a more 
comprehensive battery such as the one used in this research, to lend more credence 
to the results and interpretations.
3.5  Clinical applications
Research  such  as  this  has  good  clinical  utility  as  there  is  a  vast  array  of tests
available to choose from. This provides Clinical Psychologists with a clear indication
of a useful battery of tests which have been demonstrated to distinguish malingering
with  superior  discriminatory  power  compared  to  a  shorter  screening  measure.
Furthermore,  Clinical •  Psychologists  may  not  ordinarily  be  aware  of the  utility  of
including  a  cognitive  symptom  inventory  to  detect  malingering  in  cases  where
cognitive symptomatology is not the primary focus (for example, Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder).  This  research  provides  strong  support for the inclusion  of a specialised
cognitive  symptom  inventory to  improve the  discriminatory power of a  malingering
101test battery.
An  aim  of  this  research  was  to  evaluate  the  utility  of  a  new  cognitive  symptom 
inventory, the Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ). The CDQ was found to 
have good discriminatory power independently and be more effective when used in 
conjunction with other detection strategies. The CDQ could potentially be shortened 
without losing sensitivity or specificity. The ‘not sure’ responses did not add to the 
power of the test battery when the combination stanine scores were computed.  In 
addition, the ‘frequency’ and ‘distress’ ratings add a significant amount of time to the 
administration time without significantly improving to the discriminatory power. These 
three variables could be removed, shortening the test, with little alteration to the test’s 
effectiveness.
Finally,  perhaps the ultimate test of a malingering battery’s utility is the potential to 
stand  up  to  Daubert  challenges  in  court.  Clinical  Psychologists  require  tests  of 
malingering that have a strong evidence base to warrant their use in court. In order to 
do this, a test battery needs to be evaluated in research, it needs to be peer reviewed 
and published,  it has to meet an acceptable threshold for sensitivity and specificity 
and  is  required to receive general  acceptance  in the scientific community (Horn  & 
Denny, 2002). This research goes some way to establishing a new test battery that, 
following publication, could pass Daubert challenges in court. With a new protocol for 
the admissibility of scientific evidence  in  UK courts pending  (Select Committee for 
Science and Technology, 2005), research such as this will give confidence to Clinical 
Psychologists in choosing a battery of tests to assess malingering.
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The favourable opinion applies to the research sites listed on the attached form. 
Conditions of approval
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With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project
Chair
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Information sheet for participants (Date: 27/10/2006, Version 3)
(Ealing & West London Mental Health Trust Research Ethics 
Committee registration number: 06/Q0410/48)
You are being asked to participate in a research project. The following information 
sheet explains what the research is about, why it is being carried out and what will be 
asked of you if you agree to take part. If  you do not wish to take part then you do not 
have to. If you decide not to take part, then this will not affect your rights in any way. 
If you have any questions about the research, then please feel free to ask.
This sheet is your copy to keep.
Title of  Research
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms 
Aim of  Research
The research compares people with genuine mental health problems to people who are 
asked to pretend they have a mental illness. This helps researchers to develop 
questionnaires which can tell between genuine mental health problems and faked 
ones.
What would you have to do?
If you decide to take part then you will be asked a series of questions about symptoms 
of mental health problems. You will also be asked to complete some tasks on a 
computer. We would like you to answer these questions as honestly as possible and to 
complete the tasks to the best of your ability. All together, this should take 
approximately 1  hour. We have no reason to believe that you will experience any 
difficulties as a result of taking part.
This research does not involve any physical examinations or medications. Whatever 
you decide will not affect the care you receive in any way.
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. If you decide you do not want 
to take part, you can withdraw from the research at any time.
*This research has been reviewed and approved by Ealing & West London Mental 
Health Trust Research Ethics Committee.
107Information sheet for patients (Date: 27/10/2006, Version 1)
(Ealing & West London Mental Health Trust Research Ethics 
Committee registration number: 06/Q0410/48)
You are being asked to participate in a research project. The following information 
sheet explains what the research is about, why it is being carried out and what will be 
asked of you if you agree to take part. If  you do not wish to take part then you do not 
have to. If you decide not to take part and you are a patient, then this will not affect 
your current or future treatment in any way. If you have any questions about the 
research, then please feel free to ask.
This sheet is your copy to keep.
Title of  Research
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms 
Aim of  Research
The research compares people with genuine mental health problems to people who are 
asked to pretend they have a mental illness. This helps researchers to develop 
questionnaires which can tell between genuine mental health problems and faked 
ones.
What would you have to do?
If you decide to take part then you will be asked a series of questions about symptoms 
of mental health problems. You will also be asked to complete some tasks on a 
computer. We would like you to answer these questions as honestly as possible and to 
complete the tasks to the best of your ability. All together, this should take 
approximately 1  hour. We have no reason to believe that you will experience any 
difficulties as a result of taking part.
This research does not involve any physical examinations or medications. Whatever 
you decide will not affect the care you receive in any way. Nothing will be recorded 
in your notes, whether you choose to participate or not.
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. If you decide you do not want 
to take part, you can withdraw from the research at any time.
*This research has been reviewed and approved by Ealing & West London Mental 
Health Trust Research Ethics Committee.
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Participant Consent Form (Date: 27/10/2006, Version 3)
(Ealing & West London Mental Health Trust Research Ethics 
Committee registration number: 06/Q0410/48)
Title of Research
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms
Name of Researcher
Philip Minoudis
tVi
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 27  October 
2006 about the above research and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.
I understand that taking part in this research is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without having to give a reason. Withdrawing from the research will not 
affect my rights in any way.
I agree to take part in this study.
I understand that if I tell the researcher anything that suggests a risk of harm to myself 
or to others, the researcher will inform appropriate services.
Name of Participant  Date  Signature
Name of Researcher  Date  Signature
REMEMBER THAT YOU MAY WITHDRAW FROM THIS RESEARCH AT 
ANY TIME WITHOUT ANY CONSEQUENCE
109Patient Consent Form (Date: 27/10/2006, Version 1)
(Ealing & West London Mental Health Trust Research Ethics 
Committee registration number: 06/Q0410/48)
Title of Research
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms
Name of Researcher
Philip Minoudis
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 27th October 
2006 about the above research and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.
I understand that taking part in this research is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without having to give a reason. Withdrawing from the research will not 
affect my treatment or rights in any way.
I understand that sections of my medical notes may be looked at by the researcher 
where it is relevant to taking part in the research. I give permission to the researcher 
to have access to my medical notes.
I agree to take part in this study.
I understand that if I tell the researcher anything that suggests a risk of harm to myself 
or to others or an intention to leave the hospital without permission, the researcher 
will inform the nursing staff.
Name of Participant  Date  Signature
Name of Researcher  Date  Signature
REMEMBER THAT YOU MAY WITHDRAW FROM THIS RESEARCH AT 
ANY TIME WITHOUT ANY CONSEQUENCE
1104.4 Appendix: Measures1)  Weschler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) (Wechsler, 2001).
112WTAR Word  List -  OK pronunciation  guide
Say, 8   will  show you some words that I  wili ask you to pronounce.  Place the WTAR Word Card in front of the examinee. As you point to the card, say, 
Beginning with  the first word on the  list,  pronounce each word  aloud.  Start with  this word (point to item  1), and go down this  column,  one after 
the other,  without skipping any. When you finish this  column, go to the next column (point to the second column). Pronounce each word  even  iff you
are  unsure.  Bo you  understand? When you are sure that the examinee understands the task, say, Ready?  Begin.
Item Pronunciation
Score
(0,1) Item Pronunciation
Score
(0,1)
1. again ah-GEHN ah-GAIN or uh-GEHN or uh-GAIN 26. conscientious con-shee-EN-shss
2. address ah-DRESS or uh-DRESS 27. homily HOM-ih-lay or HOM-ih-lee
3. cough kawf or kof 28. malady MAL-uh-day or MAL-uh-dee
4. preview PREE-vyue 29. subtle SUH-tl
5. although awl-THO 30. fecund FE-cund or FEE-cund
6. most mohst 31. palatable PAL-ah-tuh-bul or PAL-uh-tuh-bul
7. excitement eck-SITE-munt or ik-SITE-munt 32. menagerie meh-NA-juh-ree
8. know noh or no 33. obfuscate OB-fuh-skate
9. plumb plum 34. liaison lee-AY-zon or lee-AY-zn
10 decorate DEK-oh-rate or DEK-uh-rate 35. exigency eks-IH-jen-say oreks-lH-jen-see
11. fierce fee-us or feerss ' 36. xenophobia zen-oh-FO-bee-uh
12. knead need 37. ogre OH-gur
13. aisle iyle 38. scurrilous SKUR-ih-lus or SKUR-uh-lus
14. vengeance VEN-jnss 39. ethereal ih-THEE-ree-ul or ih-THEER-ee-ul
15. prestigious pre-STIJ-us or pre-STEEJ-us 40. paradigm PAH-rah-dime
16. wreathe reeTH 41. perspicuity per-spuh-KYEW-uh-tee
17. gnat nat 42. plethora PLETH-oh-rah or PLETH-eh-rah
18. amphitheatre AM-fih-thee-uh-ter 43. lugubrious loo-GOOB-ree-uss or loo-GOO-bree-uss
19. lieu loo or l(y.)oo 44. treatise TREE-tiz or TREET-iz
20. grotesque gro-TESK 45. dilettante DILL-ih-tan-tay or DILL-uh-tahnt
21. iridescent ihr-ih-DESS-unt or ihr-uh-DESS-unt 46. vertiginous ver-TIDJ-in-iss
22. ballet BA-lay or ba-LAY or bal-ay 47. ubiquitous you-BIC-wuh-tiss or you-BIC-wuh-tus
23. equestrian eh-KWESS-tree-un or ih- KWESS-tree-un 48. hyperbole hy-PER-bul-lay or hy-PUR-bul-lay
24. porpoise PAW-pss or POR-poyz (Scots) |  49. insouciant in-SOO-see-yunt
25. aesthetic ess-THET-ik or ees-THET-ik 1  50- hegemony heh-GEM-o-nee or heh-JEM-o-nee or HEH-geh-mon-ee
WTAR Raw Score2)  Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis, 1975).
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AB CD.3)  Line Bisection Task (LBT) (Schenkenberg et al., 1980).
This task was presented on a laptop. Participants were read the following instructions 
aloud while presented with an example item.
Instructions:
There are two horizontal lines on the screen. Each line has another line that goes 
through it. Your task is to decide which of these lines that go across the screen has a 
line that goes through the middle of it. You should press either the key with the V  
sticker on it if it is the left line or the key with the ’R’ sticker on it if you think it is the 
right hand line.
Example of one of the items:
1  A
1  B
1144)  Ganser questionnaire (created from previous research).
This questionnaire was presented on a laptop. Only numerical responses were 
required. Each question was presented individually. Response and reaction time 
were recorded.
Instructions
Please answer the following questions:
1.  How many days are there in a week?
2.  How many weeks are there in a year?
3.  How many sides does a square have?
4.  What is 1  plus 2?
5.  How many legs does a dog have?
6.  What is 5-1?
7.  How many hours are there in a day?
8.  How many seconds are there in a minute?
9.  How many things are there in a dozen?
10. How many legs do people have?
11. How many wheels does a bicycle have?
12. How many months are there in a year?
13. How many minutes are there in an hour?
14. How many things are there in a pair?
1155) Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ) (Coxell).
This questionnaire was presented on a laptop. Responses and reaction times were 
recorded.
Participants were presented with the following instructions on screen:
People can report experiencing a wide range of mental and sensory problems. I am 
going to ask you if you have had any of the following problems in the last three 
months. Please press the key marked ‘yes’ if you have had any of these problems, 
and the key marked ‘no’ if you have not had any of these problems. If you are not 
sure if you have had these problems please press the key with the
Each question was presented on screen individually and prefixed with:
In the last three months have you experienced...
1) Your sense of taste being much stronger than usual
2) Feeling flooded by tastes
3) Not being able to taste one thing because of being flooded by different tastes
4) Often getting a vinegar-like taste in your mouth for no obvious reason
5) Not being able to taste things on one side of your tongue.
6) Your sense of smell being much more powerful than usual
7) Feeling flooded by smells
8) Not being able to smell one thing because of being flooded by different smells
9) Often being able to smell something like burning rubber for no reason
10) Getting the taste or smell of something just by touching it (for example touching 
an apple and tasting it in your mouth before you eat it)
11) Reaching for something but your hand missing it by more than a couple of inches
12) A muscle or muscles jumping or twitching
13) Loss of the ability to write down words on paper
14) Your handwriting having changed a great deal
15) The impression that you have lost the ability to control your left hand at times and 
it seeming to have a “mind of it’s own”.
16) Finding it very difficult to judge how heavy things are when you pick them up with 
your hand
17) Finding it very hard to tell if things are hot or cold when you are touching them.
18) Finding it very hard to tell if things are rough or smooth when you are touching 
them.
19) Finding it very hard to tell how big things are when you are touching them
20) Finding it very hard to tell what shape things are when you are touching them.
21) Loss of the ability to feel sensations down one side of your body.
22) The feeling that a part of your body has got much larger.
23) Loss of the ability to feel things on your face
24) Having great trouble keeping your balance when walking
25) Your hands trembling when you start writing
26) Not being able to control your arms or hands like you used to.
27) Not being able to do things like tying up shoelaces or doing up buttons
11629) Things that you are holding seeming much bigger or smaller than they usually do.
30) The feeling that a part of your body has got much smaller
31) Not being able to do simple things like drawing simple shapes
32) Sounds being louder or more intense
33) Feeling flooded by sound
34) Not being able to concentrate on one particular sound because of feeling flooded 
by other sounds
35) Not being able to say words that you used to be able to say
36) Everyday sounds sounding somehow different to before
37) Repeating things that other people say even though you do not mean to do so
38) Repeating yourself a lot
39) Buzzing followed by ringing in the ears
40) Hearing the things that people say to you repeated over and over in your head.
41) Not being able to repeat something that somebody has said.
42) Starting to say something and then forgetting what you meant to say
43) Thinking that people talking in your language are talking in a different language
44) Not being able to remember the names of things
45) Jumbling your words when you speak
46) Your vision being much more powerful than usual
47) Feeling flooded by visual images
48) Not being able to concentrate on one visual image because of feeling flooded by 
lots of visual images
49) Things just not seeming to have any colour when you look at them.
50) Not being able to recognise things properly when you are looking at them.
51) Double vision
52) Things seeming to change colour when you look at them for more than a couple 
of seconds
53) Not being able to tell the difference between colours like you could before.
54) Things that you look at having a greenish colour to them
55) Not being able to recognise the faces of people that you know.
56) Things looking much smaller than they used to.
57) Things seeming to look much closer than they did before
58) Things looking much bigger than they used to.
59) Visual things being repeated. For example, a person will walk past you, and then 
a few minutes later you will get the impression of seeing them walk past you again.
60) Things that you look at having a reddish colour to them
61) Not being sure if you are right or left handed
62) Not understanding how to do even simple maths like adding up or taking away
63) Not being able to remember what you had for breakfast
64) Not being able to remember the first name of one of your parents
65) Not being able to remember your date of birth
66) Not being able to remember what happened yesterday
67) Not being able to remember anything for a reasonably long period of your life (for 
example not remembering anything from secondary school)
69) Getting confused between left and right
70) Loss of the ability to tell the time when you look at a clock
At the end of this section, participants were asked to rate the frequency and distress 
of each item that they had endorsed.
117In the last few months how often have you experienced <present item>?
1) Only once
2) A few times
3) About half of the time
4) More than half of the time
5) Nearly all the time
6) All of the time
How much distress has <present item> caused you?
1) None
2) Mild
3) Moderate
4) Severe
5) Very severe
1186)  Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) (Miller, 2001).
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